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You're lucky your client isn't in Guantanamo!'
INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom suggests that deference is the primary judicial
response to emergencies.2 The dominant narrative of deference, however, has
both normative and descriptive flaws. Addressing those flaws, this article
offers an account of judicial responses to emergencies as the practice of
institutional equity.
Since the attacks of September 11, the role of the courts has been at issue
because the Executive has asserted its authority to craft extraordinary
procedures. The President claims to possess the power to indefinitely detain
United States citizens as enemy combatants without affording them an
evidentiary hearing or access to counsel. 3 The Department of Justice ("DOJ")
has argued in court that it need not allow a criminal defendant access to
potentially exculpatory evidence-a position that, in the recent case of
Zacarias Moussaoui (the accused "twentieth hijacker"), prompted a federal
court to impose sanctions on the government. 4 Government sources have
1 Bill O'Reilly, The O'Reilly Factor (FOX News television broadcast, June, 2003)
(statement made to lawyers for a criminal defendant accused of a terrorism-related offense).
2 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BuT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 202
(1998) ("The traditional unwillingness of courts to decide constitutional questions
unnecessarily also illustrates in a rough way the ... maxim ... : In time of war the laws are
silent."); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 Wis. L. REV. 273, 274 (observing that the law historically remains silent concerning
government actions in response to often-exaggerated national security concerns during
wartime, which often results in substantial restrictions to civil liberties); cf Oren Gross,
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011, 1019 (2003) ("Experience shows that when grave national crises are upon us,
democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protection of human rights and
civil liberties, indeed of basic and fundamental legal principles, is concerned.").
I See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 462-63, 467-68 (4th Cir. 2003) (conducting a
deferential review of executive action and holding that the indefinite detention of enemy
combatants during wartime can be justified under the Executive's broad Article II war-
making powers), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 598-99
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the President has the authority to seize and indefinitely detain
enemy combatants during a time of war), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, 2004); cf
Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 257, 258 (discussing
enemy combatant detention).
4 See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486-87 (E.D. Va. 2003) (barring
the government from seeking the death penalty and from offering evidence connecting
Moussaoui to September 11 attacks after the government refused to allow the defendant to
present potentially exculpatory evidence), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003),
and reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, 336 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003).
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suggested that if civilian courts require such access, the government will try
defendants affected by such rulings before military tribunals. 5 Taken together,
these extraordinary procedures suggest a closed system, where executive will
is facilitated by its ability to avoid judicial review and defy other sources of
accountability, such as internal government watchdogs, 6 legislators, 7 and
nongovernmental organizations. 8
The Executive's institutional power-play has consequences for three core
values of law and governance: exigency, equality, and integrity. Exigency
compels responses to the operations of violent networks, who leverage
transnational planning and recruitment, 9 secrecy, 10 and the selection of targets
See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259, 1308-10 (2002) (describing the Bush
administration's creation of a system of dispensing justice through military tribunals).
During World War II, the Supreme Court authorized military tribunals to try Nazi saboteurs
in Ex parte Quirin. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that an alien or a citizen charged with
violating laws of war can properly be tried before a military tribunal); see also A.
Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 309, 3 10 (arguing
that Quirin, coupled with modem developments in the law of habeas corpus, provides
significant protection for defendants in military tribunals). But see Jonathan Turley, Trials
and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649, 735-39 (2002) (criticizing Quirin as improper and
unconstitutional).
6 Cf Adam Liptak, The Back Page: Palmer Raids in Redux; The Pursuit ofImmigrants
in America After Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, § 4, at 14 (discussing the reaction to
the Inspector General's report and recent antiterrorism prosecutions, and observing that the
Inspector General's report may help limit the alleged abuse of power and violations of
individual rights by the government in detaining aliens). See generally Office of the
Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the
Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of
the September 11 Attacks (April 2003) [hereinafter Inspector General Report] (describing
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") as an "internal watchdog").
I See Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: The Justice Department; Ashcrofi Seeks
More Power to Pursue Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at Al (reporting on
congressional questioning of the Attorney General in light of Inspector General Report).
8 See Jonathan D. Glater, A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights In Cases Tried By Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at A18 (describing the American Bar Association's call to Congress
to ensure that all defendants brought before military tribunals have confidential access to
civilian attorneys).
I See Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack, in How
DID THIS HAPPEN? 1,2-3, 7-13 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001) (describing
how the September 11 attacks were planned and carried out).
10 See Jenkins, supra note 9, at 1, 9 (describing compartmentalization in Al Qaeda
operations, including the September 11 attacks); Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of
Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62
MD. L. REv. 173, 197-200 (2003) [hereinafter Margulies, Virtues and Vices] (discussing
communications within violent transnational networks).
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in urban centers l l to maximize violence against innocents. To achieve their
goals, networks such as Al Qaeda must generate "false negatives"-people
akin to the September 11 hijackers who avoid detection and apprehension. 12
The government has a legitimate interest in filling gaps that assist inthe
production of false negatives. 13 Unfortunately, heightened vigilance for false
negatives can breed disproportionate increases in false positives-persons
wrongly identified, detained, or adjudicated-among particular groups, such as
Muslims, Arabs, or South Asians.14 This unequal increase in false positives for
some groups imposes opportunity costs by creating resentment at home and
abroad, which, in turn, can frustrate efforts to combat terrorism. 15
Distortions in the balance between exigency and equality in terrorism
matters may also have broader negative effects on the integrity of the legal
system. 16 Crude, categorical enforcement measures-such as those broadly
I See Kanan Makiya & Hassan Mneimneh, Manual for a 'Raid', N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan.
17, 2002, at 18 (discussing Al Qaeda training manuals, which suggest targeting population
centers).
12 See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457,
469 (2002) (discussing aspects of violence by transnational networks that fit within both
"war" and "crime" models).
13 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000)
(explaining the constitutional and policy bases for government regulation of transnational
organizations practicing violence); Margulies, Virtues and Vices, supra note 10, at 203
(discussing how courts have found that "Congress could reasonably find that the
transnational scale and serpentine accounting of terrorist organizations make it impossible to
accurately trace human or financial capital," permitting Congress to "bar all contributions as
a prophylactic measure"); Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the
First Amendment after Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 330-32 (2000) (arguing
that the inability to directly regulate unlawful activities of transnational violent networks
justifies regulation of the networks' access to capital). But see David Cole, Enemy Aliens,
54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 957-58 (2002) (raising constitutional questions regarding regulation
of transnational networks).
4 See Inspector General Report, supra note 6 (discussing the lack of terrorist ties of over
one-thousand aliens detained after September 11); Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals:
Immigration, Terror, and Democracy after September 11, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 481, 499
[hereinafter Margulies, Uncertain Rivals] ("Governance by scapegoating does not serve
security or democracy.").
15 See GRAHAM E. FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 86 (2003) (arguing that
"[t]he nature of the War Against Terrorism and subsequent U.S. policies in the Middle
East... dispelled the considerable Muslim sympathies generated at the human level for the
American public after the September 11 attacks").
6 See Gross, supra note 2, at 1134 (stating that crises and emergencies test people's faith
in political and legal institutions, and suggesting that implications from the war on terrorism
may shake American faith in the integrity of the government); cf Margulies, Virtues and
Vices, supra note 10, at 210 (criticizing the government's unilateral assertion of authority to
monitor conversations between prisoners and their attorneys as "enforced solidarity with the
state" that "impairs the lawyer's usefulness to the client in pursuing entirely lawful
[Vol. 84:383
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contained under the rubric "racial profiling"--may obtain a renewed
legitimacy if they are used in anti-terrorism efforts. 17 The implicit threat of
indefinite detention may allow the government to extract guilty pleas on
equivocal evidence from defendants charged with terrorism-related offenses in
civilian courts. Courts, which have been divested of the ability to
meaningfully review executive decisions, will descend to the moral equivalent
of "collection agency" status, more or less functioning as efficient
instrumentalities of executive will. 18 Executive power, unchecked by the other
branches of government, threatens to undermine the Constitution's balance
between immediate needs and abiding values. 19
Discounting such costs to equality and integrity, the deferential approach
privileges executive assertions. Invoking the judiciary's lack of competence in
war and foreign affairs, deferential courts downplay the adverse impact of
extraordinary measures, such as indefinite detention of alleged enemy
combatants, on equality and integrity,20 as well as the opportunity costs that
exacerbate rather than alleviate exigency. 21 The result, as one of the framers
objectives").
'7 See Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675,
724-26 (2002-2003) (discussing the harm to dignity and the alienation that results when the
government targets particular groups in its law enforcement efforts); Samuel R. Gross &
Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1423-30
(2002) (same); see also Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Profiling, September 1 1,h, and the
Media: A Critical Race Theory Analysis, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing
racialized images in media portrayals of post-September 11 figures).
11 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 369, 373 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the panel's decision for allowing "deference to matters of Exectuive authority in
matters of war to eradicate the Judiciary's own Constitutional role[, which is the] protection
of individual freedoms guaranteed to all citizens," and for rubber-stamping the Executive's
unsupported designation without proper procedural or substantive review).
19 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 168 (2000) (arguing that "[i]f democratic self-government involves a nation's
generation-spanning struggle to live under self-given foundational law over time, apart from
or even contrary to popular will at any given moment, the counter-majoritarian difficulty
collapses"); cf Jon Elster, Social Institutions, in NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
147, 150 (1989) (observing that "[t]he parts of a constitution that make it more difficult to
change the constitution than to enact ordinary legislation ... force people to think twice
before they change it"); Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum
Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, 28-31 (1999) [hereinafter Margulies, Democratic Transitions]
(discussing the "institutional repertoire" of branches of government and nongovernmental
organizations that furthers deliberation and guards against domination by single individual
or entity in democracy).
20 Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 371 (Motz, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's holding that
providing an evidentiary hearing and access to counsel for an alleged unlawful combatant
was unnecessary and unduly intrusive on executive branch prerogatives).
21 FULLER, supra note 15, at 86 (asserting that the disproportionate enforcement policies
in the United States that resemble racial profiling have dispelled sympathy for the
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famously warned, is-the worst of both worlds: governance that ensures neither
democracy nor public safety.22
Fortunately, history and precedent reveal that courts responding to crises
have often rejected deference in favor of a more pragmatic approach. In Ex
parte Milligan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a functional federal court
system was the forum of first resort for the trial of persons charged with
sedition and like crimes.23 In the Steel Seizure Case, the Court held that the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief did not extend to seizing steel
mills without congressional approval. 24 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court held
that, without sufficient justification, the executive branch lacked authority to
indefinitely detain aliens who had entered the United States and had already
been ordered to be removed from the country. 25 This approach, which I call
institutional equity, seeks to allocate the risk of uncertainty that crisis yields
between the three branches. Analogizing the government's assertion of
authority for emergency procedures to a party's plea for an extraordinary
remedy such as an injunction,26 a court practicing institutional equity will
consider the importance of judicial review for limiting false positives, the
adequacy of existing, non-emergency procedures for protecting the public, and
the balance of hardships among the three branches.
One crucial hardship in the balance, identified by Justice Jackson in his Steel
Seizure Case concurrence, is the impact of the court's decision on institutional
checks and balances. 27  Exigent procedures rarely derive from express
legislative authority, which places the clearest imprimatur of legitimacy on the
executive's power to act.28 Instead, courts must struggle to draw the ambit of
Americans felt by many Muslim nations after September 11 and have potentially caused
more people to act against the United States).
22 See 147 CONG. REc. S11,019 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
.(quoting Benjamin Franklin as observing that "a nation that would trade its liberties for
security deserves neither").
23 71 U.S. 2, 122 (1866) (holding that a long-time Indiana resident, who had no
demonstrable ties to the Confederate military, could not be tried before a military tribunal).
24 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [The Steel Seizure Case], 343 U.S. 579, 589
(1952) (holding that President Truman lacked the authority to seize steel mills during a labor
dispute in order to prevent a shortage of steel during the Korean War).
25 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001) (remanding the habeas petitions of two immigrants, who
were detained indefinitely after an order of final deportation was entered, to determine if
their continued detentions were unreasonable).
26 See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE
(1991) (analyzing equitable relief, its functions, and when such relief is appropriate).
27 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that "[w]hile the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government," and that "[i]t enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity").
28 See id. (explaining that "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express ...
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
[Vol. 84:383
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implied legislative authority where the legislature has neither expressly granted
nor denied the executive branch the authority at issue.29 Drawing this ambit
too widely will result in executive overreaching. 30 By the same token, drawing
the ambit too narrowly will require the legislature to expressly authorize a
wide range of executive measures, making government action too cumbersome
to be effective in crises. 3 1 Institutional equity strikes a balance by interpreting
the scope of implied legislative delegation to the Executive in light of "the
imperatives of events," 32 avoidance of constitutional issues, and consistency
with international law. Drawing on the freedom from formalism that courts
have customarily demonstrated in fashioning remedies 33 and in habeas
review,34 institutional equity tailors exigent procedures to fit gaps in the legal
system, 35 while requiring procedural safeguards, such as access to counsel for
alleged enemy combatants, that preserve equality and integrity.
Institutional equity's "latitude of interpretation for changing times"' 36 may be
disconcerting for both champions and critics of executive authority.
Champions of executive power may blanch at institutional equity's cabining of
exigent procedures. 37 Critics of executive power may object to institutional
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate").
29 See id. at 637 (describing the various spheres in which the President wields power
either delegated from, concurrent with, or in opposition to the legislature, and the legitimacy
of each).
30 Id. at 650 (noting the appeal of exigent circumstances as a "ready pretext for
usurpation" by the executive).
31 Id. at 640 (warning against "doctrinaire textualism" in construction of legislative
authority).
32 Id. at 637.
31 See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) (explaining that
throughout several hundred years of history, courts' equity jurisdiction has been
characterized by flexibility, not rigidity).
14 See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 5, at 310 (discussing habeas corpus developments
since Quirin); David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as
Limits on Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2512 (1998)
(arguing that the 1996 immigration statutes do not limit but actually extend federal habeas
jurisdiction to protect criminal aliens); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive
Detention, and the Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 963 (1998) (contending that,
while Congress has attempted to insert finality into executive deportation orders of illegal
aliens, the Supreme Court has continuously preserved habeas corpus jurisdiction to inquire
into the authority of such removal).
35 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695-96 (2001) (crafting a decision granting
habeas to leave "no 'unprotected spot in the Nation's armor' (quoting Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953))).
36 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31 The Supreme Court of Israel has developed a case-by-case approach to judicial review
of military action that has much in common with the model advanced here. See Aharon
Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 153-60 (2002) (discussing rulings on law and terrorism by the Israeli
2004]
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equity's willingness to find implied legislative authority for enemy combatant
detention and military tribunals. Moreover, as the district court's sanctions in
United States v. Moussaoui demonstrate, attempts to chart a course of
institutional equity may result in a facile compromise that discounts
defendants' rights.38  When applied with appropriate care, however,
institutional equity can offer a framework for assessing judicial review of
procedure in antiterrorism efforts that incorporates both the flexibility that
government requires and respect for lasting values.
Part I of this article analyzes the values of exigency, equality, and integrity
in the law and terrorism context, focusing on the risk to the rule of law that
exigency presents in times of crisis. Part II depicts deference as the dominant
narrative in both normative and descriptive accounts and uses a post-
September 11 decision on access to information to illustrate how deference
compounds the risk of executive assertions of exigency. Part III outlines the
alternative account represented by institutional equity, which applies the
tailoring methodology of equitable remedies jurisprudence and habeas review
to resolve the separation of powers problems of law in times of crisis identified
by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case. Part IV applies institutional
equity to important procedural issues on the law and terrorism front,
considering the indefinite detention of alleged enemy combatants, access of a
criminal defendant such as Zacarias Moussaoui to exculpatory information
within the government's control, and access to exculpatory information in the
military tribunal context.
I. THREE VALUES FOR LAW IN CRISIS: EXIGENCY,
EQUALITY, AND INTEGRITY
Judicial review of procedure in law and terrorism cases should reflect three
core concerns: exigency, equality, and integrity. Courts must reckon with
exigency because of the grave consequences of a mass terror event. 39 Equality
is always a concern in a democracy that values participation by all members of
the polity and seeks to constrain the application of invidious criteria by the
government to any person within the nation's borders. 40 Institutional integrity
Supreme Court).
18 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 486-87 (E.D. Va. 2003) (dismissing the death penalty charge and
precluding all discussion of the defendant's connection to the September 11 attacks to
protect him from governmental abuse, while simultaneously denying access to potentially
exculpatory evidence and full confidential access to counsel).
" The nearly 3000 victims of the September 11 attacks included a wide spectrum of
persons from diverse national, racial, ethnic, and socio-economic groups. See, e.g., Tahra
Bahrampour et al., A Nation Challenged: The Victims: Blunt Talker, Devoted Aunt, Russian
Emigre, Young But Wise Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 1, at 15 (telling the stories of
thirteen different people with very different backgrounds, all of whom were killed on
September 11).
40 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 362 (1986) (arguing that the "dominant conviction
[Vol. 84:383
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is a core value in a democratic system that depends on perceptions of
legitimacy to elicit the consent of the governed.41 This Part analyzes the
interaction and conflict among these core values.
A. Exigency
Courts often adjust standards of reasonableness to reflect the importance of
perceived exigency. Across the legal spectrum, a showing that serious harm is
possible in the near or foreseeable future will heighten requirements for private
actors charged with preventing harm or will relax procedural requirements
imposed on government action to prevent overreaching. For example, in a
formula that has profoundly influenced the law of torts, Judge Learned Hand
indicated that reasonableness might require a heightened standard of care when
lack of due care could cause an injury of sufficient gravity despite a lower
probability that the injury would in fact occur.42 In the law of remedies,
"irreparable harm" that cannot be redressed by a subsequent monetary award
justifies the issuance of an injunction, a form of relief considered extraordinary
because of its assertion of control over the future conduct of an individual or
entity. 43 In the realm of criminal procedure, courts have also suggested that a
[of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment] was abstract: that the Constitution should
require the law to treat all citizens as equals"); cf T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES
OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 177-81
(2002) (asserting that many arguments regarding equality for citizens also apply to aliens
present within the nation's borders); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the
Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1130-37 (1994) (arguing that
aliens should have first amendment protections substantially similar to those of citizens);
Linda Kelly; Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 185, 235-36 (1998) (arguing that traditional categories of citizen and alien
reflect artificial distinctions); Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals, supra note 14, at 499(arguing
that allowing government unchecked authority to treat aliens differently encourages
scapegoating that distracts from other pressing problems).
41 See Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,
91 AM. POL. SC1. REV. 245, 260 (1997) (asserting that the "consolidation [of democracy]...
occurs only when a society adheres to... [democratic] procedures").
42 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding
that reasonableness can be determined on a calculus that assesses liability when the burden
of preventing the injury is less than the gravity of the harm caused multiplied by the
probability of such injury occurring); see also William E. Nelson, From Fairness to
Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117,
124 (1999) (discussing the evolution of tort law in New York). See generally CARL T.
BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS,
AND THE COMMON LAW 173-96 (2001) (discussing evolution of products liability law).
"1 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (stating that the remedy of an
"injunction is 'to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case' (quoting Irwin v.
Dixion, 50 U.S. 10, 33 (1850))); DAN D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §
2.1, at 27, § 2.5, at 57 (1973); cf LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 5-6 (arguing that irreparable
harm is no longer a significant factor in awarding equitable relief).
2004]
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more modest showing of probable cause than the usual might govern searches
by law enforcement officers for a ticking bomb44 and that the failure to give
Miranda warnings would not compel the suppression of a defendant's
statements made during interrogation in a situation posing an imminent danger
to the officers' safety.
45
After the horrific events of September 11, the risk of further mass violence
against civilians by operatives of transnational networks such as Al Qaeda has
become exigency's paradigm case. Even before September 11, the Supreme
Court noted, in a case limiting the government's power to indefinitely detain
aliens already adjudged to be deportable, that such limits on government might
not extend to the terrorism context.46 Since September 11, both courts and
commentators have expressly or impliedly invoked Judge Learned Hand's torts
trade-off between gravity and probability of harm to justify government
responses to terrorism-related risks.47
Considerations of exigency related to the operations of transnational violent
networks go beyond the prospect of mass casualties. The government's
legitimate interest in preventing future attacks is matched by heightened
I See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000) (suppressing, in a routine criminal
case, the fruits of a search based on an anonymous informant's description of an
individual's appearance, but suggesting that information about a bomb might present a
different set of considerations).
45 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657-58 (1984) (concluding that "the need for
answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety" can outweigh the
requirement that police read a suspect his Miranda warnings before questioning him).
46 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696, 701 (2001) (requiring the government to
release aliens from detention within six months after issuing a final deportation order, unless
the government can show a "significant likelihood" that it will be able to effect deportation
of the alien in the "reasonably foreseeable future," while observing that a detainee's
potential link to terrorism may constitute a "special circumstance" justifying further
detention).
" See Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that the
government, when making a decision to apprehend an individual suspected of plotting
terrorist activity-namely, a pre-September 11 plan to bomb the World Trade Center-was
entitled to consider not only the probability that an individual had engaged in such activity,
but also the extent of the destruction that could have resulted); Cf ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ,
WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE
187-96 (2002) (discussing constitutional concerns with false positives and restrictions on
civil liberties after September 11, while arguing that the challenges of terrorism complicate
the issue and may necessitate certain restrictions); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Fury: Why
Congress Must Curb Bush's Military Courts, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 20
(arguing that public interest requires some revision of the balance between false positives
and false negatives when people who turn out to be false negatives "slaughter innocent
civilians, and may well have access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons"). But see
Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44
(cautioning against lowering the standards of proof in terrorism cases brought in courts,
military tribunals, or other venues).
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difficulties in obtaining information about such attacks and deterring the
planners and paymasters. As courts in the asylum and refugee law context
have noted, obtaining information transnationally is an arduous and sometimes
impossible task.48  While the United States has formed international
relationships to develop information, some governments have offered only
grudging and guarded cooperation. 49 Legal, political, and practical barriers to
reaching conduct that occurs transnationally, such as the planning of the
September 11 attacks in Hamburg, Germany,50 reinforce the exigency element.
In the months before September 11, the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned a
pragmatic, interstitial approach that would fill gaps in national security and
public safety and prevent exploitation of weak spots by sophisticated
operatives of transnational networks.51 On this view, courts are seeking to
preserve a state of equilibrium, promoting the stability, safety, and security that
foster democracy, while fashioning appropriate constraints on government. 52
Justice Jackson's familiar argument that the Constitution is not a "suicide pact"
also speaks to the search for this kind of pragmatic balance between two
dangerous extremes. 53 In pursuing that gap-filling enterprise, however, courts
may discount movement toward a more ominous equilibrium, where
accommodations of exigency swallow up the rules themselves, leaving the
government unaccountable.5 4
48 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987) (discussing how the
difficulty of obtaining information transnationally and the gravity of risk to an asylum-
seeker justify that the individual need only show a ten percent chance of persecution if she
were to return to her country of origin when seeking to demonstrate a "well-founded fear of
persecution").
49 Cf Neuman, supra note 13, at 331 (discussing difficulties in regulation of
transnational networks).
50 See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 104 (2002)
("To launch the 9/11 operation Al Qaeda used Germany, the UAE, and Malaysia as
launchpads to enter the United States.").
51 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96 (noting that the constraints imposed by the Court on
the government's power to detain aliens still left the nation protected (quoting Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602 (1953))).
51 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 373-74 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting)
(observing that the majority failed to properly balance the Executive's need for discretion in
waging war with the rights and liberties protected by the Bill of Rights).
13 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(asking that courts "temper... doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom" to maintain
public order and safety while preserving individual liberty).
" See Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 373 (Motz, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for, in
effect, precluding all meaningful judicial review of Hamdi's constitutional claim by rubber-
stamping the Executive's practically unsupported designation of Hamdi as an enemy
combatant).
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B. Equality
To disrupt this ominous equilibrium, courts must address the damage that
exigent measures can do to equality. Exigency justifies an exponential
increase in governmental power and discretion. The increase in governmental
authority results in categorical judgments that disfavor groups on the basis of
nationality, ethnicity, religion, and immigration status. 55 History and recent
experience with government responses to September 11 indicate that the
overwhelming number of people affected adversely by such categorical
judgments are false positives, i.e., persons with no connections to terrorism. 56
Increases in executive branch power that fuel inequality develop in two
overlapping dynamics of crisis. First, exigency inevitably shapes perceptions
of what is "reasonable" in the interpretation and enforcement of existing rules.
Second, exigency impels the creation, increased use, or rediscovery of
substantive and procedural vehicles, such as military tribunals or detention
without criminal charges, that allow government wide discretion to make
categorical judgments. Exigency's adverse impact on equality has a long
pedigree in American history. 57 The suppression of civil liberties during
World War 1,58 the "Palmer Raids" immediately following the war's
conclusion, the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War
II,59 and the excesses of the McCarthy Era60 all imposed special suffering on
immigrants or those perceived to be "other." 61 These disturbing episodes
55 See Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1582-83
(2002) (claiming that by engaging in racial profiling of Arab- or Muslim-looking men, the
government bears a resemblance to private individuals who commit hate violence attacks).
56 See Inspector General Report, supra note 6 (criticizing the DOJ for delays in serving
notices of immigration charges, slow clearance processing, and abuses in detainees'
treatment); Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY
AM. L. 295, 297-300 (2002) (describing marginalization of particular communities after
September 11); Cole, supra note 13, at 955-57 (same); Volpp, supra note 55, at 1576
(same).
" Exigency's risks for equality accompany the risks to liberty, implicit in the discussion
here and in the next section, dealing with threats to systemic integrity that often hinge on
governmental overreaching. See discussion infra Part I.C.
58 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 104 (1977) (describing the legal profession's response to World War 1).
59 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (upholding government
order authorizing internment of Japanese-American citizens on grounds that internment
served a "compelling" government interest).
60 See JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 4-5 (1st ed. 1999)
(discussing the atmosphere of suspicion prevalent in the McCarthy Era).
61 See Cole, supra note 13, at 955-57 (arguing that in the wake of September 11, the
government has selectively sacrificed non-citizens' liberties to further citizens' security
interests).
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provide a convenient template for government officials who have initiated
discriminatory policies in the wake of September 11.
The government's creation of false positives through categorical judgments
is most apparent in the post-September 11 enforcement of immigration laws,
an area where the government already has wide discretion.62 After the attacks,
the government, in what it called an anti-terrorist initiative, apprehended and
detained on visa violation grounds approximately 1200 foreign nationals, most
of whom were from countries in the Middle East or South Asia.63 Although
the government discovered virtually no terrorist connections in this group, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service 6 detained most under unduly harsh
conditions, hindered their access to attorneys, held deportation hearings in
secret, and failed to prevent their abuse by other inmates and guards.
Ultimately, the government deported most of the detainees after holding them
for months longer than necessary, even given the time required for thorough
investigation of any possible terrorist ties.65
62 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999)
(stating that many provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Imigrant Responsibility
Act ("IIRIRA") were aimed at protecting the Executive's discretion from judicial
intervention).
63 See Inspector General Report, supra note 6 (reporting the circumstances and
nationality of 762 aliens classified as September 11 detainees); Akram & Johnson, supra
note 56, at 331 (reporting that, within weeks after September 11, the government arrested
and detained about 1000 people); cf BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 33-
38 (2001) (discussing "the politics of foreignness-the cultural symbolic organization of a
social crisis into a resolution-producing confrontation between an 'us' and a 'them"'); Cole,
supra note 13, at 959 (warning of scapegoating of aliens).
64 The Immigration and Nationalization Service ("INS") ceased to exist as of March 1,
2003 as a result of restructuring pursuant to the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"). The immigration service functions of the INS were transferred to a new
bureau within DHS, Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"). See Rules and
Regulations: Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 68
Fed. Reg. 10,922 (Mar. 6, 2003) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 103, 239).
65 Although the government has asserted that it has terminated this particular anti-
terrorism initiative, it continued at least one other program requiring the "registration" of
foreign nationals on temporary visas, prioritizing registration of nationals from the Middle
East and South Asia, and authorizing the deportation of all those visitors found to be out of
status. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 68
Fed. Reg. 2363 (Jan. 16, 2003) (requiring specified nonimmigrant male aliens from
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Kuwait to register with the INS and provide
requested information); see also Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview
Requirements From the Special Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed.
Reg. 67,578 (Dec. 2, 2003) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 264) (announcing DHS's intention to
replace special registration with "a more tailored system in which it will notify individual
aliens of future registration requirements"). While the apprehension of foreign nationals
who violate the terms of their visas serves legitimate immigration goals, see David A.
Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning
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The combination of discretion and categorical judgments may be even more
of a problem in the new or revived procedural vehicles that the executive
branch has indicated it will use to combat terrorist threats. The government
can hold someone as a material witness, detain him as an enemy combatant, or
try him before a military tribunal. 66 The breadth of these alternative means of
confinement and adjudication supplements the already wide substantive sweep
of federal criminal law.67 For example, the executive order issued by the
President declares a broad jurisdictional ambit for military tribunals, including
any member of Al Qaeda or person involved in international terrorism. 68 The
order establishing the tribunals does not permit appeal to civilian courts of
either jurisdictional issues or ultimate dispositions on the merits.69 In addition,
the procedures of the tribunals, which do not require a jury or a unanimous
verdict, provide fewer protections for the accused than civilian fora.70 While
tribunals may be appropriate in a carefully limited set of circumstances replete
with procedural protections, 7' the wide jurisdictional grant, lack of safeguards
at trial, and absence of judicial review in the Bush administration's order
ofZadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 47, 48-50, equality is not served by the extended
detention of only one cohort in this group without any particularized showing of special
need.
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2003) (allowing, under certain circumstances, detention of
material witnesses); see also Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).(giving the Department of
Defense authority to establish military tribunals that could, at the President's discretion, try
captured members of Al Qaeda).
67 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 758 (1999) [hereinafter Richman, Federal
Criminal Law] (discussing expansion of prosecutorial power yielded by expanding scope of
federal criminal law); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability, 83 VA. L. REv. 939 (1997) (analyzing the lack of
accountability of federal prosecutors and the risk of enforcement based on stereotypes).
68 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,835 (ordering that "military tribunals shall have exclusive
jurisdiction"); Bryant & Tobias, supra note 5, at 310 (analyzing Ex parte Quirin and
challenging the Bush administration's assertion that the Quirin precedent limits federal
habeas corpus proceedings in the context of military commission's orders); Katyal & Tribe,
supra note 5, at 1260 (arguing that without legislative involvement, Bush's executive order
creating military tribunals for unlawful belligerents is unconstitutional); Turley, supra note
5, at 652-56 (examining the history of military justice and asserting that the military
tribunals created by Bush are a threat to the military's core functions and to the tripartite
system of government).
69 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. at 57,835-36 (establishing military tribunals' exclusive jurisdiction).
" Id. at 57,834-35 (establishing procedural rules governing military tribunals).
71 See infra notes 263-267and accompanying text (discussing the limited set of cases
where the government can make a threshold jurisdictional showing that defendants have
acted as "enemy belligerents").
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trigger substantial concerns that inferences based on the ethnicity, nationality,
or declared religion of the accused will play a significant role.
C. Integrity
Just as exigent measures threaten equality, they also endanger the integrity
of legal institutions. Exigent measures can promote arbitrary and inaccurate
outcomes. They can also undermine the separation of powers and diminish the
accountability that produces fair and effective institutions in a democracy. The
wide discretion and multiple fora characteristic of exigent procedures
encourage arbitrary outcomes dictated more by the shifting agendas and turf
battles within the executive branch than by the weight of the evidence. 72
Consider the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the accused "twentieth hijacker," in
which a civilian court has sought to impose safeguards against arbitrariness or
unfairness. 73 In the face of such judicial efforts, the government has suggested
that it will resort to exigent procedures such as charging Moussaoui before a
military tribunal. 74 Civilian courts may then face two unattractive options.
First, a court can reaffirm the applicability of recognized norms such as the
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial in civilian proceedings, knowing that the
government can exit to a forum such as a military tribunal and effectively
nullify the court's decision. Second, a court can interpret norms in a manner to
the government's liking to avoid the embarrassment of the government's exit.
Because the government can use exigent procedures to evade constitutional
norms, it can also apply pressure on defendants to plead guilty to terrorism
charges in civilian courts regardless of the defendants' level of culpability. 75
72 Few principles are closer to the heart of constitutionalism than the mandate to treat like
cases alike. Yet, no principled justification supports the disparate treatment accorded a
United States citizen like Jose Padilla, apprehended in the United States and held in military
custody for many months without charges, and a French national like Zacarias Moussaoui,
duly charged in criminal proceedings with being the "twentieth hijacker." Justification also
seems lacking for the disparate treatment accorded the "American Taliban," John Walker
Lindh, charged and convicted in criminal proceedings, see United States v. Lindh, 212 F.
Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002), compared with both Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi,
an American citizen apprehended under similar circumstances to Lindh in Afghanistan and
currently detained by the military. The Administration's decisions about the procedure and
forum suitable for alleged terrorists seem driven increasingly by convenience and a wish to
avoid accountability rather than by differences in the conduct of the alleged terrorists
themselves. See generally Lewis, supra note 3 (discussing Padilla and Hamdi, the detention
of the Guantanamo prisoners, and new immigration measures and the erosion of
fundamental rights).
" United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003).
14 See Philip Shenon, White House Called Target of Plane Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2003, at A7 (reporting that the dismissal of the criminal case against Moussaoui would lead
to his trial before a military tribunal).
" See Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Antiterrorism
Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2003, at B15 (quoting a lawyer, who was
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The prospect of indefinite military detention without control by the courts or
consent by the legislature serves as a kind of "shadow penalty" that influences
defendants' choices without control.
Moreover, these exigent procedures increase the government's ability to
conduct its business in secret, avoiding scrutiny from the media and the public.
The foreclosure of opportunities to question government action creates little
incentive for the government to take into account the positions of others or to
question itself.76 This complacency can in turn lessen the government's
alertness and debilitate its responses in the face of truly exigent circumstances.
Secrecy and exigency can also promote inappropriate procedural moves by the
government-such as the cultivation of ex parte contacts with courts-that
compromise the adversarial underpinnings of the legal system.77  These
developments undermine the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, both
within the country and with external audiences whose cooperation is necessary
to effectively combat terrorism.
II. DEFERENCE AS DOMINANT NARRATIVE
Judicial deference is the dominant narrative in accommodating exigency,
equality, and institutional integrity in terrorism cases. The deferential
approach, which privileges the political branches' judgments concerning
exigency, finds support in Supreme Court precedent, 78 in some post-September
11 cases, 79 and in the rhetoric of some commentators, who cite the deferential
decisions as a basis for skepticism about the role of the courts in crises. 80
representing a defendant charged with providing "material support" to a terrorist
organization, as claiming that his client "decided to plead guilty after prosecutors suggested
that... [his client] could be declared an enemy combatant and be held indefinitely without a
lawyer"). See generally Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L.
REv. 563 (1999) (discussing the incentives a suspect has to speak both truthfully and falsely
while detained and interrogated byfederal law enforcement).
76 Cf William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 665, 677-78 (2002) (discussing the importance of media coverage in promoting
government accountability). See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30-43 (1970)
(discussing the role of "voice" in preventing complacency within institutions).
77 See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 5, at 317-32 (discussing the circumstances
surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in the Quirin case).
78 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936)
(confirming the broad discretion given to thePresident in the realm of foreign policy,
especially in times of war).
79 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463-64 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding the
indefinite detention of an alleged unlawful combatant), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, 337
F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004).
80 See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 221-23; Gross, supra note 2, at 1023 (arguing that
under circumstances of grave national dangers, the right response is to go beyond
constitutional principles); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 299 (arguing that executive officials
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While in the next Part I suggest that precedent is more complex than the
commentators' heuristic would suggest, I limit myself here to a very brief
summary of the institutional arguments that support the deferential view, an
illustration of the inadequacy of those arguments drawn from a post-September
11 decision, and a glance at deference's polar opposite: absolutism.
The deferential approach argues that concerns about institutional
competence, separation of powers, and jurisdiction should constrain judicial
scrutiny of military and law enforcement activity. Arguments from
institutional competence suggest that second-guessing by courts of the
decisions of other branches, particularly those driven by the changing
landscape of law enforcement and national security priorities, may be futile or
counter-productive. 81  For example, recent years have seen a marked
diminution of cases imposing severe sanctions on prosecutors, such as
dismissal of an indictment based on misconduct short of an outright
constitutional violation, as part of the court's inherent authority.
82
Courts have carved out an even more substantial zone of deference
regarding military and foreign affairs decisions, again based on the fear that
holding the government to a higher level of accountability will undermine the
government's ability to respond to exigent circumstances. 83 In matters such as
should be able to exercise extra-constitutional emergency powers, rather than have such
powers judicially rationalized as consistent with the Constitution).
81 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992) (holding that federal judges
lack supervisory power over grand juries other than to sanction misconduct); Nicki Kuckes,
Grand Jury Independence and Other Legal Fictions (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author) (critiquing the Supreme Court's view in Williams); see also In re Application of
the United States for Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363 (S.D.N Y. 2002)
(invoking the supervisory power to require an investigation of alleged improprieties in the
interrogation of a terrorist suspect who turned out to be a "false positive"); cf John Gleeson,
Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal
Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423, 427-28 (1997) (urging limits on judicial use of inherent
authority to sanction prosecutors conducting law enforcement investigations). See generally
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 381 (2002) (discussing the proper scope of the supervisory power over federal
prosecutors).
82 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 172-73 (2004) ("Indeed, few convictions are
overturned by virtue of prosecutorial misconduct and, in the rare incidences of reversal, the
appellate court opinions invariably neglect to identify the prosecutor by name .... Also,
prosecutors ... seldom, if ever, face criminal charges for their work on the job."); see also
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 697 (1987) (finding that prosecutorial misconduct often
goes unpunished and that potential deterrents are rarely employed by courts).
83 See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (deferring to the President's broad
discretion to determine the benefit of enforcing a Joint Resolution of Congress on the
prohibition of arms sales to foreign countries). Compare John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639, 1681-84 (2002) (arguing that the Constitution
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criteria for the admission or removal of immigrants, which precedent has
linked with the prerogatives of sovereignty, defense, and the conduct of foreign
affairs, 84 the courts have declined to impose direct substantive constraints on
legislative authority. The Supreme Court has also held that it lacks jurisdiction
over military proceedings involving prisoners held abroad 85 and has allowed
the military substantial leeway in shaping the rules of military proceedings in
the United States regarding both foreign nationals and citizens accused of
violating the law of war.
8 6
The flaws in the deference approach are apparent in recent appellate
decisions upholding categorical closing of immigration proceedings for post-
September 11 detainees 87 and the unavailability under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") of information about these proceedings. 88 A
majority of courts have accepted the government's theory, which argues that
the release of any information would contribute to a "mosaic" of information
helpful to international terrorist groups.89 In both cases, the government failed
to demonstrate the accuracy of its assertion, relying on a conclusory affidavit
from one law enforcement official and, in the FOIA case, on unsupported
assertions at oral argument.90 The courts ignored equality concerns, failing to
creates a flexible system of war powers under which Congress's appropriations power is a
sufficient check to the Executive's broad authority to initiate military intervention abroad),
with Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 271-81 (1972) (critiquing the
broad assertion of executive authority regarding war and foreign affairs).
84 See Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2003) (holding that Congress may require
mandatory detention of a deportable alien for a brief period necessary for his removal
proceedings to be completed); cf ALEINIKOFF, supra note 40 (critiquing the Court's
deference to Congress's "plenary power" over immigration law); Kelly, supra note 40, at
187 (same); Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals, supra note 14, at 491-95 (arguing for a
pragmatic interpretation of Congress's power).
85 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-81 (1950) (denying enemy aliens access
to U.S. courts).
86 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (finding that the alleged unlawful
belligerents were not entitled to a civil proceeding and could be constitutionally tried before
a military court without a jury).
87 Compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that the Attorney General can order blanket closure of immigration hearings to the
media and the public), with Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that a particularized showing by the government is required for closure).
88 See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that the detention information and the names of detainees and their attorneys
are covered by Exemption 7(A) of the FOIA).
89 See, e.g., id. at 928-29 (finding the "mosaic" argument persuasive, and observing that
other courts have done likewise).
90 See id. at 940 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (criticizing the "government's vague, poorly
explained allegations," and asserting that the majority, "by filling in the gaps in the
government's case with its own assumptions about facts absent from the record...
converted deference into acquiescence").
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acknowledge that the government's apparent targeting of groups such as
immigrants on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion without evidence
of terrorist ties was a matter of significant public interest. 9' The courts also
ignored the costs to the judiciary's institutional integrity sustained by allowing
the government's minimalist proffers to trump accountability to the public.92
Deference may be so dominant because its polar opposite, absolutism, so
persistently withholds the "latitude of interpretation [needed] for changing
times." 93 Armed with the important insight that exigency can become a mantra
for government overreaching, absolutists assert that the criminal justice system
model is the only appropriate model for dealing with transnational violent
networks. 94 In the process, absolutists cabin exigency so severely that the
91 See id. at 946 (discussing the defendants' lack of terrorist ties as a matter of public
interest).
92 The related area of the government's acquisition of information regarding terrorism
has also excited controversy, largely beyond the scope of this article. For example, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), as amended by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT") Act, allows the government both to obtain a warrant on the
ground that a subject is an "agent of a foreign power," 50 U.S.C. § 1801, and to use
evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant in a criminal proceeding as long as procuring
foreign intelligence was a "significant purpose" of the investigation. 50 U.S.C. §
1804(a)(7)(B); cf. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719-20 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2002) (analyzing relevant standard). See also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD (2004)
(discussing threats to privacy in antiterrorism measures, while recognizing legitimate
national security interests); cf. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot
Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 636-37 (2003) (arguing that
statutory changes simply updated principles applicable to surveillance of other forms of
communication, such as telephone conversations, to include the Internet).
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [The Steel Seizure Case], 343 U.S. 579,
640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
94 See Richard Leiby, An American Justice; Free-Spoken Judge Challenges the White
House over 'Combatant' Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at CO 1 (discussing a federal
district judge's issuance of a set of interrogatories to the Executive regarding detention of
alleged "unlawful combatant" Yaser Esam Hamdi, including a requirement that the
government prove not merely that the detainee had carried a weapon when he was captured
in Afghanistan, but that he had also fired the weapon); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337
F.3d 335, 369, 373 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority's
holding that continued detention of Hamdi did not require an evidentiary hearing or access
to counsel, and praising the district judge's "courage," but acknowledging that the judge's
demand for a forensic investigation had required a level of specificity of information from
the Executive that showed insufficient consideration for the imperatives of combat). One
court has displayed a similarly quixotic brand of courage and rigidity in finding that federal
law authorizes detention of material witnesses at trial but not before grand juries. See
United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that a grand
jury proceeding is not a "criminal proceeding" within meaning of the material witness
statute). But see In re Application of the United States for Material Witness Warrant, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 287, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the federal material witness statute applied
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government is left with virtually no flexibility at all. 95
III. INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY AS COUNTER-NARRATIVE
There is another path, which I term institutional equity. Institutional equity
requires that the government justify exigent measures-such as detention of
alleged enemy combatants-by demonstrating in court that existing legal
remedies are inadequate and that the balance of hardships tilts in its favor.
This inquiry is equitable in character because it tracks the pragmatic test for
extraordinary relief in remedies jurisprudence. It is also institutional in
character because it seeks to cultivate a form of judicial "practice [that] will
integrate" the prerogatives, interests, and agendas of the three branches into a
"workable government. '96
A. Crisis and Institutional Power
The starting point for institutional equity is the uncertainty that crisis yields
for the roles of the three branches. In Justice Jackson's classic analysis of
institutional prerogatives, "presidential powers.., fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. '97 Courts should
to grand jury proceedings).
9' See DWORKIN, supra note 40 (rejecting any role for military tribunals or detention of
unlawful combatants). Compare Cole, supra note 13, at 967-69 (criticizing efforts to
regulate the financing of transnational violent networks as unconstitutional, while
acknowledging that Al Qaeda may be an exception), with Margulies, Virtues and Vices,
supra note 10, at 200-12 (arguing that regulation of transnational violent networks is an
appropriate exercise of congressional power).
Another recent commentator has provocatively called for an "Extra-Legal Measures"
model, which allows the Executive to act outside commonly accepted legal norms in
extraordinary circumstances when the Executive candidly states the basis for the action and
secures ratification from the court, the legislature, or the electorate. See Gross, supra note 2,
at 1096-1102 (proposing such a model). While the Extra-Legal Measures model presents a
healthy challenge to assumptions about the unitary nature of the rule of law, it does not
adequately acknowledge the degree to which perceptions of exigency inevitably stack the
deck in favor of ex post ratification of executive action. Inevitably, the result will be a
"common law of exigency" that mimics the results of the deferential approach.
96 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); cf
Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373,
374 (2002) (discussing the Steel Seizure Case's relevance for contemporary issues of
separation of powers, including those raised by anti-terrorism measures). For a working
definition of the concept of a "practice" that is consistent with this account, see BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 164 (2001) ("A social
practice involves an activity that contains integrated aspects of both meaning and behavior,
linked together by a loosely shared body of... norms and patterns of action.").
" See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also
Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadow, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 90
(2002) (arguing that the importance of the Steel Seizure Case lies not in its doctrinal value,
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accord the greatest deference to the actions of the Executive when the
Executive acts pursuant to express or implied legislative authority. 98 The
scope of implied delegation from Congress to the President is broadest in the
arenas of war and foreign policy, where excessive judicial supervision would
intrude on the flexibility and flow of information that permit the nation to
control its sovereign affairs.99 In the absence of express or implied authority
from Congress, the executive and the courts operate in a "zone of twilight"
governed by pragmatic improvisation.100 Where the President's actions appear
but in its symbolism, i.e., the notion that "actions do not achieve the status of law...
because they are the actions of government").
98 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 ("When the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum .... ").
99 Id. at 636 n.2 (noting that "narrowly definite standards," such as those a court might
impose, are inappropriate in a "matter intended to affect a situation in foreign territory").
00 Id. at 637 (stating that this area of concurrent authority exercised by Congress and the
President features highly fluid and contingent boundaries). The pragmatism of Justice
Jackson, who had served as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Attorney General prior to his
appointment to the Court, was a hallmark of the public servants who came to Washington at
that time. See Stephen Breyer, The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems and Possibilities in
the Administrative State: Afterword, 92 YALE L.J. 1614, 1620 (1983) (discussing the
pragmatic perspective of New Deal administrators); Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Why
Select a Favorite Case?, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1197 (1996) (observing Justice Jackson's
reliance on "experience" as opposed to formalist "logic"); see also ROBERT H. JACKSON,
THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 93-103 (John Q. Barrett
ed., 2003) (discussing Justice Jackson's analysis that President Roosevelt had independent
authority to negotiate and implement the "Lend-Lease" program that provided assistance to
the British war effort prior to America's entry into World War II).
Pragmatism, on this account, focuses on the consequences of human action and the
development of institutions to refine lessons of experience through dialogue among
participants in the polity. See John Dewey, The Problem of Method, in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS 184, 186-87 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) (commenting that "[t]he
man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches," criticizing sole
reliance on "expert judgement" as "oligarchy managed in the interests of the few," and
stressing the importance of "consultation and discussion which uncover social needs");
William James, Pragmatism 's Conception of Truth, in PRAGMATISM AND FOUR ESSAYS
FROM THE MEANING OF TRUTH 131, 145 (Ralph Barton Perry ed., 1943) ("[W]hat meets
expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences ....
Experience... has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas.").
See also LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 360
(2001) (describing Dewey's "hypothesis that thinking and acting are just two names for a
single process-the process of making our way as best we can in a universe shot through
with contingency"); Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals,
74 TEX. L. REv. 523, 558 (1996) (arguing that striving to refine understanding of
consequences in the face of uncertainty is central to a pragmatist conception of law);
Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019, 1031 (1991) ("[P]ragmatist practice ... notices
characteristic kinds of errors or biases that recur when practitioners [are] caught in specific
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incompatible with legislative intent, judicial scrutiny should be most intense so
as to dissipate the "ready pretext for usurpation"'' occasioned by the
Executive's profligate proclamations of emergency. The novel demands
placed on government by the risk of transnational mass terror add to the
complexities acknowledged in Justice Jackson's analysis. 10 2 Justice Jackson's
framework implicitly acknowledges the centrality of reading the often faded
tea leaves known as legislative intent in situations where legislative signals are
not express or uniform. 10 3 In the absence of express or uniform grants of
authority from Congress on an issue such as the detention of alleged "enemy
combatants," courts must discern the existence and limits of implied authority
in an array of oblique and sometimes conflicting legislative pronouncements.
Interpretive devices such as "clear statement" rules further compound the
challenges faced by courts considering issues at the intersection of law and
terrorism. Courts construe textual silence or ambiguity in statutes in order to
minimize conflicts with important values. 104 Unfortunately, since important
values often clash in the legal arena, clear statement rules have a nasty habit of
cultural environments."); cf PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL
THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 328-30 (1992) (distinguishing Dewey's
pragmatism from stark conception of instrumental rationality embodied in the maxim, "[t]he
end justifies the means").
"01 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 650; cf Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1763-71 (1996) (discussing the evolution of
pragmatic conception of separation of powers in American history).
102 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634 (acknowledging that broad
presidential powers may have enduring consequences on the power structure balance).
103 See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225, 227
(1998) (discussing contrasting schools of statutory interpretation, including the
"purposivist" school, which seek to interpret statutes consistently with Congress's over-
arching aims and objectives; the "textualist" school, which purports to focus solely on
statutory language; and the "intentionalist" school, which looks for evidence of Congress's
specific intent); cf Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism
and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 37-38 (2004) (discussing latent ambiguities in congressional
authorizations of exigent measures); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 718-21 (1997) (arguing that interpretation ostensibly
focused on the text of statutes, rejecting aids to interpretation such as legislative history,
may push Congress to give clear directives to courts and agencies).
'04 Courts reason that Congress should make its objective clear if it wishes to enact a
statute that conflicts with such values. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 282-83 (1994) (discussing the benefits and limitations of a
clear statement rule for judicial interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip N.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REv. 593, 597 (1992) (describing the creation of "super strong" clear statement
rules); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 326-27 (2000)
(discussing how clear statements may help give guidance to courts deciding cases of
executive discretion).
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producing conflicting results. 10 5 Generally, courts are more willing to find an
implied legislative grant of authority to the Executive in the domain of defense
and foreign affairs than in domestic law.' 0 6 However, courts analyzing an
issue such as implied legislative authority for detention of alleged enemy
combatants may also inform their interpretive efforts by consulting
constitutional mandates such as due process 10 7 or provisions of international
law such as the Geneva Convention, which could limit the scope of executive
action outside the domestic realm.'0 8 The hybrid nature of transnational mass
terror attacks such as the events of September 11, which include elements of
both the "crime" (domestic) and "war" (transnational) paradigms, 10 9 only
deepens the complexities confronted by institutional equity. In sum,
construing the existence and limits of implied legislative authority for the
Executive's implementation of exigent procedures regarding terrorist threats
lands the courts in a murky realm closely resembling Justice Jackson's "zone
of twilight."
Institutional equity wrestles with "the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables" that populate this domain because the stakes are
too high to abandon the task."10 It recognizes, as Justice Jackson did in the
Steel Seizure Case, that any judicial approach is imperfect."'I A decision to
second-guess administrative decisions may unduly discount the exigency
105 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 396 (1950)
(observing that different canons of construction can lead to multiple interpretations of
similar language).
116 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
107 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (holding that, in order to avoid
tension with the First Amendment, the Court must interpret legislative authority to bar the
Secretary of State from withholding a passport based on petitioner's refusal to submit an
affidavit regarding membership in the Communist Party); see also Sunstein, supra note 104,
at 331 (arguing that interpretation based on constitutional values trumps deference otherwise
due to administrative agencies under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). But see William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a
Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 880-91 (2001) (arguing that construing
statutes to avoid constitutional questions distorts the separation of powers).
1"8 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1105 (1990) (arguing that "United States
statutes should be read 'where fairly possible' so as not to violate international law"); cf
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 3
Eur. H.R. Rep. 60-61 (1981), which held that anti-sodomy laws were invalid under the
European Convention on Human Rights, in support of a holding invalidating sodomy laws).
109 Cf Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457,
463-66, 477-79 (2002) (discussing the uneasy fit of both terrorism and anti-terrorism
enforcement within "war" or "crime" paradigms).
'10 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 636 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
" Id. at 635 (noting that any judicial approach would be "indecisive").
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requiring difficult choices. By the same token, a decision to defer to
administrative decisions may short-change equality and compromise the
integrity of the legal system. Fortunately, the intertwined traditions of equity
and habeas corpus offer guidance in meeting this challenge.
B. Equity, Habeas, and History
Equity developed as a vehicle that permitted courts to do justice to the
demands of a particular situation where legal doctrine might not provide the
necessary flexibility.' 12 A court of equity views values like exigency, equality,
and integrity not as mutually exclusive, but as elements that the court must
integrate through the exercise of reflective judgment.' 13 As an illustration of
the deliberative process that equity entails, consider Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
where the Supreme Court held that a district court had discretion to decline to
issue an injunction for violations of a World War II executive order on pricing
despite statutory language directing that an injunction "shall be granted" upon
proof of a violation. 1 4 The Hecht court viewed equitable discretion regarding
the imposition of remedies as a virtue in a democracy, observing:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to
do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private
needs .... 15
..2 See LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 19-22 (1991) (discussing the history of equity and
remedies jurisprudence); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976) (describing the use of equitable relief by
courts to remedy violations of civil rights and other norms by governmental institutions); cf.
Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 489-91 (1999) [hereinafter Margulies, New Class Action]
(critiquing the lack of participation and deliberation within public interest class actions that
hinder their effectiveness in reforming institutions and proposing reforms). But see Ross
SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS
RUN GOVERNMENT 113-17 (2003) (critiquing public law remedies as unduly disruptive to
political branches).
113 Cf. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 142 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (observing
that an equitable "decree is adapted to a given situation"). For a modem account of
judgment with an Aristotelian turn, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 66-74 (1993) (discussing the dialectic between
"sympathy" and "detachment" in legal representation). Cf Mustafa Emirbayer & Ann
Mische, What Is Agency?, 103 AM. J. Soc. 962, 976-78, 995-96 (1998) (discussing the
continuum between Aristotle and modem schools of thought including pragmatism);
Margulies, Virtues and Vices, supra note 10, at 176-79 (discussing importance of both
empathy and independent judgment in lawyering).
114 321 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1944) (upholding judicial discretion under the statute).
115 See id. at 329-30; see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 112, at 194-95
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The flexibility of equitable discretion therefore served an institutional purpose,
allowing Congress to focus on setting overarching norms free from the
paralysis that might ensue from an ex ante obligation to resolve all hard
cases. 116 For the Hecht Court, the institutional virtues of equitable discretion
survived the exigencies of war-time. 1 7 Indeed, the exercise of equitable
discretion harmonized with exigent circumstances by moderating an executive
tendency toward harshness that could have alienated important players in the
war effort." 18
The origins and workings of the writ of habeas corpus parallel the
development of equity. Courts and scholars have noted that.the writ began as a
creature of the English equity courts,' 19 functioning as a collateral remedy for
individuals confined by the government when standard remedies such as direct
appeals were unavailing or exhausted. The command in the federal habeas
corpus statute, to award the relief that "law and justice require,"' 20 dovetails
(praising the exercise of equitable discretion in Hecht); cf TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-
95 (1978) (holding that the Endangered Species Act abrogated equitable jurisdiction,
requiring issuance of an injunction against construction of a dam to save the endangered
snail darter fish).
"6 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at 143 ("[T]he very nature of the equitable... [is] a
rectification of law where law falls short by reason of its universality."); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM L. REV. 990, 1001 (2001) (discussing gap-filling in
statutory interpretation guided by the Aristotelian principle that "equity is the correction of
the general words when the matter falls outside their sense"). The downside of equitable
discretion is the risk that exceptions can ultimately undermine the rule. See Peter H.
Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of
Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 182-85 (discussing the
virtues and flaws of administrative discretion in implementation of federal law).
117 Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329 (discussing the history of equitable discretion, and
refusing to ignore its flexibility without specific authorization from the legislature).
118 Id. at 328 (stating that a court does not have to issue an injunction "merely because
the Administrator asks [for] it").
"I Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) ("[H]abeas corpus has traditionally been
regarded as governed by equitable principles."); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs
and Federal Common-Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1413, 1453
(2002) ("The writ itself was a creation of the English courts of equity, fashioned back in the
fourteenth century."); David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 782-83
(1994) (discussing Justice Stevens's view that the term "justice" in the habeas statute should
be defined with reference to "equity and equitable principles"). But see I JAMES LIEBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.1 (1988) (asserting that habeas
developed as a legal, not equitable, remedy, while acknowledging that habeas has typically
been viewed as collateral relief available only when direct legal relief such as appellate
review was inadequate). See generally Neuman, supra note 34 (analyzing the history of
writ and applicability in situations implicating the foreign affairs power).
120 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2003); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20,
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with the fluid authority provided by equity jurisdiction. 121 Indeed, a court
finding that an alleged enemy combatant detained after September 11 had a
right to be heard and to be assisted by counsel praised the "flexibility" found
within the "blend of procedures" authorized under habeas corpus, noting that
the Great Writ "'is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic
remedy."" 22 The pragmatic turn in both remedies and habeas jurisprudence
offers a bracing antidote to deference's abdication.
C. Institutional Equity in Action: A Preliminary Perspective
The pragmatic character of institutional equity makes it an effective vehicle
for integrating potentially conflicting values such as exigency, equality, and
integrity in law and terrorism cases. 123 Three elements are crucial: (1) the
likelihood of false positives; (2) the adequacy of existing remedies; and, (3) the
balance of hardships. The next three subsections discuss each in turn.
1. Likelihood of False Positives
Courts recognize that the creation of false positives through the state's
sanctioning or restraining of a blameless or nondangerous person undermines
constitutional governance with its promise that the state will act fairly and with
due regard for individual rights. Rules of procedure, such as burdens and
standards of proof, reflect this concern. 124 Assertions of exigency dull concern
about false positives, focusing attention on the grave risks posed by false
negatives. 125 Mindful of this dynamic, courts adjudicating exigent procedures
have usually assessed the likelihood that the procedure would yield inaccurate
results for individuals that may be subjected to government power. 126
Habeas corpus has been the prevailing judicial method for testing the
2004). See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 5, at 349-55 (discussing habeas doctrine); McCord,
supra note 119, at 783 (same).
121 Exercise of a judicial "supervisory power" over prosecutorial practices and litigation
in federal courts springs from similar roots. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 81, at 405-
13 (discussing appropriate use of supervisory power).
122 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243
(1963)).
12' For an analysis reflecting a parallel perspective, see Donald Downs & Erik Kinnunen,
A Response to Anthony Lewis, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 385, 399 (discussing the need for
pragmatic analysis that constrains executive power but preserves flexibility in responses to
exigent situations).
124 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 350, 361-65 (1970) (holding that due process requires
that the prosecution show a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); see also id. at 372
(Harlan, J., concurring) (viewing the Court's holding as "bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free"); cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976) (establishing
"risk of error" as one element of procedural due process analysis).
121 See Tribe, supra note 47, at 20.
126 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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likelihood of false positives. Courts have held that the writ lies even in cases
where the Executive has fashioned rules for exigent procedures, such as
military tribunals, that failed to provide for habeas review. 127 The Supreme
Court has interpreted statutes to permit habeas review of deprivations of liberty
such as deportation even when the statutory language and legislative history
are silent. 128 Habeas corpus encourages an individualized brand of judicial
review that disfavors categorical judgments and minimizes false positives.
Even at the apex of judicial deference toward the political branches' exigent
measures, the Court, in its adjudication of the Japanese internment program
during World War II, indicated that categorical measures were appropriate
only for an exceedingly limited time. 29 In a companion case, the Court
effectively terminated the internment program, holding that the Executive
exceeded its statutory authority in detaining a concededly "loyal and law-
127 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942) (allowing a petition for writ to
civil courts even in cases of military tribunals).
1"8 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-99 (2001) (requiring a clear statement from
Congress in order to repeal a writ). Indeed, even courts that ultimately express deference to
executive branch determinations acknowledge the role of habeas in promoting
accountability. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, the Fourth Circuit, while ultimately
holding that the detention of the petitioner as an unlawful combatant required neither an
evidentiary hearing nor access to counsel, also observed that "the power to detain could
easily become destructive" if exercised without judicial oversight. 316 F.3d 450, 464 (4th
Cir. 2003), reh 'g and reh "g en banc denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004).
129 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (limiting the scope of
the ruling to times of "direst emergency and peril"). For further discussion of the limits on
the duration of exigent measures, see discussion infra Part III.C.3.b. Of course, limited
duration does not excuse or conceal the abuse of government power based on stereotypical
fears like those that drove the Japanese internment program. See Patrick 0. Gudridge,
Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1933, 1942-44 (2003) (discussing Justice Robert's
dissent over the "artificial" nature of the limited duration framework); Natsu Taylor Saito,
Symbolism under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans
as "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 4-6 (2001) (describing the effect of anti-Asian sentiment
and politics on the internment policy). Justice Jackson dissented in Korematsu but did not
find that the government had acted unconstitutionally. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243-44
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that although the order would violate the Constitution in
peacetime, it may nevertheless be a valid military order). While Justice Jackson was
concerned that upholding the government's measures could compromise both equality and
integrity by lending such measures the Court's imprimatur, he was also wary of encroaching
on the Executive's prerogatives in wartime. As a result, he suggested, in an opinion that
satisfied virtually no one, that the Court should have declined to hear the case. Id.; see also
Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the
Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 455, 493 (criticizing Justice Jackson's
position on grounds that "judicial abstention may popularly and even formally be
understood as tacit approval").
2004]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
abiding citizen" of Japanese-American descent.13 0
Another World War II decision, Ex parte Quirin, illustrates the durability of
the Court's concern with the likelihood of false positives in a highly charged
environment.' 31 In Quirin, which upheld the constitutionality of military
tribunals to try Nazi saboteurs, the Court relied on the petitioners' stipulation
that they had embarked on a mission at the behest of the German High
Command that involved their surreptitious entry into the United States with
explosives "to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States."'
132
While members of the Court engaged in a troubling series of ex parte contacts
with the executive branch prior to issuing their decision,13 3 commentators
criticizing those contacts have not questioned the Court's core factual
finding.'
34
2. Adequacy of Existing Remedies
In the law of remedies, courts consider the adequacy of remedies at law,
including damages, when a party seeks an extraordinary remedy, such as an
injunction.' 35 Injunctive relief is an interstitial remedy, available to fill gaps
130 See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294, 297 (1944), discussed in REHNQUIST, supra
note 2, at 201-03; Gudridge, supra note 129, at 1947-53 (outlining the Court's holding).
131 317 U.S. 1 (1970).
132 Id. at 20-22, cited in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 369 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J.,
dissenting); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 136 (recounting the undisputed facts in
Quirin); Turley, supra note 5, at 734-35 (same).
133 See Turley, supra note 5, at 735-39 (reporting the Executive's meetings and
communications with members of the Quirin Court).
134 Two of the Quirin petitioners adduced substantial evidence at their subsequent trial
that they had withdrawn from the conspiracy by contacting the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Id. at 735. While withdrawal mitigates guilt, it is not completely
exculpatory. Under the law of conspiracy, withdrawal is an affirmative defense to liability
for subsequent acts committed by co-conspirators but not a complete defense to the charge
of conspiracy itself. See United States v. Robinson, 217 F.3d 560, 564, 565 n.3 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that abandonment is only a limited defense once the conspiracy has passed
the attempt stage); cf Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1379
(2003) (arguing that withdrawal is appropriately only a partial defense because public
interest favors deterrence of initial entry into a conspiracy). The efforts of the two
defendants, while not sufficient to convince the finder of fact to acquit, ultimately resulted
in pardons dispensed by the President. See Turley, supra note 5, at 739 (describing the
political aftermath of the Quirin decision).
135 See OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6, 91 (1978) (arguing for a contextual
approach to granting relief for civil rights violations); LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 8-9
(discussing adequacy and arguing that this factor is essentially equivalent to the requirement
that a party seeking equitable relief demonstrate "irreparable injury" in the absence of
relief); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Revisited? Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury
Rule Threaten the Warren Court's Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1343, 1373-80 (2002) (cautioning against restriction of remedies for constitutional
violations); see also Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L.
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when ordinary remedies do not adequately address possible harm. 136 In the
institutional equity context, a court considers whether the government, when it
asserts authority to implement exigent procedures such as detention of
unlawful combatants, has adequate remedies at its disposal within the existing
legal framework that would obviate the need for exigent procedures. 137
The adequacy of the existing remedies inquiry tempers the tendency of the
executive branch to overreach in emergencies. In Ex parte Milligan, the Court
noted that civilian courts were available to try the petitioner, a long-time
resident of Indiana, apparently acting independently of Confederate forces,
whom the government had put on trial before a military tribunal on charges of
sedition. 138 In the Steel Seizure Case, the Court held that the President lacked
authority to seize steel plants during the Korean War to ensure continued steel
output during a labor dispute, citing a range of express legislative remedies
already available in order to demonstrate that Congress had not intended to
impliedly authorize additional measures. 139 In Hecht Co. v. Bowles, the Court
held that a merchant's good-faith efforts to comply with war-time price
regulations were adequate to address the public interest in compliance,
rendering unnecessary the curtailment of the court's equitable discretion,
Rev. 1577, 1603-04 (2002) (analyzing adequacy in restitution context). But see Grupo
Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 332-33 (1999) (holding that
a freeze of a debtor's assets sought by a bondholder to preserve those assets was beyond the
scope of federal equity jurisdiction in a diversity case because it was outside the jurisdiction
of traditional English courts of equity); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The
Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 234-35 (2003)
(criticizing the Grupo Mexicano decision). See generally John Leubsdorf, The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978) (analyzing the elements, and
concluding that courts have interpreted standards flexibly to respond to compelling cases).
136 See DOBBS, supra note 43, § 2.10 (stating that courts will only grant injunctions if no
other legal remedy is adequate to address the harm).
137 Cf Gross, supra note 2, at 1107 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's observation that
"'[t]here are extreme cases where the laws become inadequate even to their own
preservation"' and that "'on great occasions every good officer must be ready to risk...
going beyond the strict lines of law'). Of course, the tailoring contemplated by the
adequacy of remedies standard finds analogs in other areas, such as constitutional law. See
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that, in
determining that the statutory prohibition on "material support" for terrorist organizations is
a permissible incidental restriction that does not violate the First Amendment, one factor to
consider is Congress's determination that other remedies would not achieve the legislative
goal of diminishing transnational violent networks' access to human and financial capital).
138 71 U.S. 2, at 107-08, 140 (1866) (stating the facts of the case and that federal courts
were open even after the declaration of a military state).
139 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [The Steel Seizure Case], 343 U.S. 579
(1952). These existing remedies included a statutory cooling-off period, the ability to shut
down noncompliant plants, and, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, use of the government's
eminent domain power. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
2004]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
which the government had sought. 140 The touchstone of each decision is
judicial attentiveness to the "reasonable, practical implications" of institutional
relationships dedicated to harmonizing exigency, equality, and the integrity of
the legal system. 1
41
3. Balance of Hardships
The balance of hardships is another fixture of remedies jurisprudence.
Balancing hardships enables courts to allocate the risks of uncertainty prior to
awarding relief and to tailor relief to minimize those risks, which include not
merely potential harm faced by the parties but also harm faced by third parties
and the public.142 Institutional equity manages the balance of hardships
through two vehicles: first, the tailoring of interpretive devices known as "clear
statement rules" that supply default positions on implied legislative intent, and
second, in cases where legislative intent is cloudy or conflicted, durational
limits on exigent procedures.
a. Default Positions
Possible hardships abound on all sides in law and terrorism cases. Harm to
national security and public safety are the most salient adverse consequences.
To mitigate the risk of these harms, courts have always indicated that executive
action outside the territory of the United States may obtain the requisite
legislative authority from broad legislative pronouncements, such as
resolutions authorizing the use of force. 143 This strand of precedent, dating
from early in the republic's history, has recognized that insisting on a
declaration of war effectively deprives the nation of the flexibility required to
cope with an uncertain and contingent world.144 This is also true where, as in
140 321 U.S. 321, 325-26, 329-30 (1944) (discussing the district court's finding of good
faith, and supporting its use of discretion).
141 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 640; see also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S.
283, 300 (1944) ("In interpreting a wartime measure we must assume that... [the political
branches'] purpose was to allow for the greatest possible accommodation between those
liberties [of the citizen] and the exigencies of war.").
142 See LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 268-69 (proposing tentative rules for choosing
between legal and equitable remedies). Balancing is also a fixture of constitutional law.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
972-95 (1987) (analyzing the virtues and drawbacks of balancing approach).
143 See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-42 (1800) (Moore, J., concurring) (arguing
that the existence of a declaration of war was irrelevant in the case of undeclared naval war
with France); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 598-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (allowing for
the detention of citizens under military authorities when Congress has passed only a
"Military Force Authorization" and not a declaration of war), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353
(Feb. 20, 2004).
144 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring) (counseling
against "doctrinaire textualism" in discerning legislative authority for executive action). But
see Katyal & Tribe, supra note 5, at 1266 (arguing for express congressional authorization
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the case of the September 11 attacks, the source of the danger strikes at targets
within U.S. territory.1 45 As the September 11 attacks demonstrated, attacks
within U.S. territory pose an even greater risk to innocents than do attacks
abroad. Courts have declined to interpose unreasonable restrictions on the
Executive's ability to move with dispatch to protect persons and property
within the United States from such exigencies.' 46
If this were the only default rule, deference would have its way. Courts
have also recognized, however, that the executive power can erode equality
and the integrity of the legal system as well as create opportunity costs through
international reaction against overreaching by the U.S. Executive.147 As cases
like Endo and the Steel Seizure Case demonstrate, courts will often deploy
constitutional principles aggressively to yield a narrower construction of
statutory authority when executive action "comes home" through attempts to
impinge on the freedom of persons, groups, or organizations within the United
States. 148
Of course, the separation of foreign from domestic assertions of executive
authority can become unduly facile. The United States is part of an
international framework of law and governance. 49  Reflecting this
interdependent relationship, courts have long sought through default rules to
harmonize American and international law. 150 Indeed, the Court has recently
referred to European law as a resource for defining the contours of the
American law of privacy forbiding government intrusion on choices about
sexuality made by consenting adults. 151 In the law and terrorism arena, the
safety and security of the United States depends in large part on promulgating
of military tribunals).
141 See The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) (holding that the
President could impose a blockade on the Confederacy during the Civil War absent a
declaration of war, and noting that "if a war be made by invasion ... the President is not
only authorized but bound to resist force by force[; h]e... is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority").
146 Id. at 670 (holding that questions of defense should be left to the Executive and not
the courts).
"'7 See Harold Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 342
(2002) (arguing that the United States should provide international "moral leadership"
through dedication to the principles underlying international law).
148 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 585-89 (arguing that the Constitution
did not give the President authority to take possession of steel mills); Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. 283, 298-300 (1944) (invoking the Fifth and Sixth Amendcments in allowing a writ of
habeas corpus for an internment prisoner).
149 See Koh, supra note 147, at 338-39.
110 See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
"I See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (referencing with approval both
a European Court of Human Rights holding that laws forbidding consensual homosexual
conduct are "invalid under the European Convention of Human Rights" and a British
Parliamentary Act repealing laws punishing homosexual conduct).
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policies that generate a transnational constituency for a global transition
toward stable, nonviolent, and democratic governance. 52 Achieving this goal
may require even more vigorous use by courts of international law to shape the
contours of matters such as criteria for the removal of immigrants, hitherto
thought to be within the virtually exclusive domain of the political branches. 153
Consistency with international law such as the Geneva Convention should also
inform judicial interpretation of the scope of legislative authority for executive
decisions regarding the treatment of alleged enemy combatants.154
b. Time Limits
When courts have believed it necessary to tailor executive action to the
default rules described above, they have often turned to time limits. Time
limits affect the balance of hardships on both the individual and institutional
level. Most obviously, they promote equality by mitigating the deprivation the
government can impose on individuals or vulnerable groups. In addition, time
limits promote systemic integrity, in effect building into exigent procedures a
sunset clause that obliges the legislature or the executive to engage in further
public conversation if they wish to extend the authority at issue. Time limits
come in two varieties. First, courts have often, at least implicitly, assumed that
the occasion for the exercise of exigent authority by the government is
temporally limited, for example, by the duration of a war.' 55 Second, courts
152 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181
(1996) (discussing the need for reciprocity in transnational legal doctrine and practice).
153 See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595-601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 23(1), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (discussing the fundamental nature of the family) and Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 3, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 46 (asserting that best interests
of child should be "a primary consideration" of courts, agencies, and legislatures)), rev 'd on
other grounds sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Maria v.
McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 219-20, 231-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing the role of
international law in determining whether immigration legislation that expanded the grounds
for deportation should be retroactive); Peter Margulies, Making "Regime Change"
Multilateral: The War on Terror and Transitions to Democracy, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Margulies, Regime Change]; Sonja Starr & Lea
Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
213, 262-65 (2003) (discussing the Beharry and Maria district court opinions). See
generally Steinhardt, supra note 108 (discussing a canon of interpretation counseling
harmonization of statutes with international law).
154 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]; see also
Preliminary Report, ABA Task Force on Enemy Combatants (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/exec/enemycombatantreport.pdf (last accessed Mar.
17, 2004).
155 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121-22 (1866) (holding that the use of a
military tribunal against a citizen of Indiana is inappropriate when civilian courts are
functioning).
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have frequently held, at least in situations where the element of exigency is
less pronounced, that the detention of specific individuals is subject to time
limits. 156
The cases on limiting the occasion for deployment of exigent procedures are
mixed. The strongest case is Ex parte Milligan, which barred resort to military
tribunals in a case where civilian courts were functioning and there was no
evidence that the detained individual, a citizen and resident of Indiana, had
acted in concert with Confederate forces.157 The Court, ruling after the
conclusion of the Civil War, noted the "fixed period"'158 taken up by the crisis
as if to explain decisions issued during the conflict that reflected greater
deference to the executive. 159 The Court's infamous decision in Korematsu,
announced after the government had already agreed under court pressure to
end the Japanese internment program, 160 also depended heavily on a temporal
perspective that assumed the government always intended the program to be a
short-lived reaction to the emergency climate following the attack on Pearl
Harbor. 161
Courts have more frequently imposed express or functional time limits on
the detention of specific individuals in various contexts. In a combination of
functional and express limits that bring a measure of accountability to the
immigration arena, the Court has recently set a presumptive limit of six months
on the time available to immigration authorities to arrange for the physical
removal of an alien from the United States after entry of a final order of
156 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 678 (2001) (holding that alien detained after
entry of final order of deportation must be released after six months if the government has
no reasonable prospect of effecting deportation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972) (holding that a criminal defendant found unfit to proceed to trial must be released if
there is no reasonable prospect that he will be restored to competence).
117 71 U.S. at 121-22.
158 Id. at 115.
'19 See, e.g., Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243, 248 (1864) (upholding use of
military commissions during Civil War by General Burnside).
16 See Gudridge, supra note 129, at 1935.
161 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (approving the decision to
intern Japanese-Americans "as of the time it was made"); Gudridge, supra note 129, at 1941
(noting the impact of time in the Korematsu decision); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (expressing an expectation that, "25 years from now," the remedy of
affirmative action "will no longer be necessary"); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.
543, 547 (1924) (holding that a proceeding in equity is an appropriate vehicle for
determining the validity of a rent control ordinance passed to respond to war-time pressure
on the housing market in the District of Columbia; the Court notes that a "law depending on
the existence of an emergency ... may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts
change"); cf Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294, 303 (1944) (expressing constitutional
doubts about continued detention of concededly loyal Japanese-Americans and interpreting
statute authorizing program to prohibit such detention).
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deportation. 162 Asserting that the hearing provided a natural end-point to the
period of detention, the Court has also upheld the mandatory detention prior to
immigration hearings of aliens who are presumptively deportable because they
have committed certain criminal offenses. 163 In a parallel line of cases with a
functional limit, the Court has indicated that the state must dismiss criminal
charges against defendants who have no reasonable prospects for attaining
competence to stand trial. 164 Moreover, the Court has required states to
consider foregoing efforts to restore defendants to competence through the
administration of psychotropic medication when the time taken to restore
competence will exceed the maximum sentence the defendant could serve for
the offense charged. 165 The Court has indicated that a heightened element of
exigency might change the contours of these functional and express time
limitations but would not necessarily eliminate them altogether.166
4. Summary
In sum, institutional equity, with its three-pronged test of likelihood of false
positives, adequacy of existing remedies, and balance of hardships, offers an
account of courts during crisis to compete with the dominant narrative of
deference. Cases like the Steel Seizure Case and Ex parte Endo reflect a
pragmatic judiciary that understands exigency but does not lose sight of the
values of equality and integrity that assertions of exigency can obscure. The
following Part considers whether institutional equity can resolve salient issues
emerging since September 11, 2001.
IV. APPLYING INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11:
THREE TOUGH QUESTIONS OF LAW AND TERRORISM
The aftermath of September 11 is a fitting crucible for institutional equity.
Assertions of executive authority abound, including blanket closure of
immigration proceedings to the public and the press, 167 heightened surveillance
162 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 678 (2001).
163 See Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2003). Under this scheme, an alien
would also be able to demonstrate, prior to her hearing, that she was likely to prevail on a
defense to removal and thus secure her release. Id. After entry of a final deportation order,
the Court's decision in Zadvydas would limit the time of detention.
164 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717 (1972)
165 See Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2187 (2003).
166 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (2001) (observing that in cases of "terrorism or other
special circumstances ... special arguments might be made ... for heightened deference to
the political branches with respect to matters of national security"). But see infra notes 217-
218 and accompanying text (arguing that the language in Zadvydas is dicta that should not
preclude time limits in cases of alleged enemy combatants).
167 Compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that the Attorney General can order blanket closure of immigration hearings to the
media and the public), with Detroit Free Press v. Ashcrofl, 303 F.3d 681, 707 (6th Cir.
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of religious groups, 168 detention of material witnesses, 69 and monitoring of
attorney-client communications. 70 Three practices raise particularly stark
conflicts with the usual assumptions of the legal system: 1) indefinitely
detaining alleged enemy combatants; 2) precluding a criminal defendant's
access to potentially exculpatory evidence; and 3) withholding access to such
evidence in military tribunals. Moreover, these three practices overlap, since
the government's success on even one issue would allow it to circumvent
judicial rejection of its arguments on the other two, perpetuating a closed
system largely free from accountability. These interrelated issues, analyzed in
turn in this Part, therefore constitute a crucial arena for the dialogue of
exigency, equality, and integrity played out in law and terrorism cases.
A. The Detention ofAlleged Enemy Combatants
The Executive's assertion of untrammeled authority to detain people
classified as enemy combatants triggers tension with the likelihood of false
positives, adequacy of existing remedies, and the balance of hardships
embodied in institutional equity. The government's refusal to accept limits or
procedural safeguards presents a significant threat to the integrity of
adjudication and to the embattled equipoise between government and
government's targets that usually works to preserve equality.' 71 In contrast,
limited power to detain unlawful combatants accompanied by substantial
procedural safeguards would address exigencies in anti-terrorism enforcement,
uphold core values such as judicial review, and dovetail with default rules
2002) (holding that a particularized showing by the government is required for closure).
168 See Linda Fisher, Political Profiling: Government Surveillance after September 11
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (analyzing dangers of surveillance of
religious groups).
169 Compare In re Application of the United States for Material Witness Warrant, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the federal material witness statute applied
to grand jury proceedings), with United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61-62
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that federal law does not the authorize detention of a material
witnesses before grand juries).
170 See Margulies, Virtues and Vices, supra note 10, at 207-10 (criticizing monitoring).
171 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second Annual Conference of
United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 J. AM. INST. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940)).
Scalia quotes Justice Jackson at length:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose his
defendants. [T]he most dangerous power of the prosecutor [is] that he will pick people
that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted. With the law
books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of
finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone... the
real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group.
Id.
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governing the scope of implied legislative authority. 172
1. Likelihood of False Positives
In the enemy combatant cases, the government has done little to
accommodate concern about the likelihood of false positives. The government
has argued that a detainee has no right to present evidence to counter the
government's allegationsI 73-such as the claim that enemy combatant detainee
Jose Padilla took steps on behalf of Al Qaeda to secure a "dirty bomb"174-and
is not entitled to consult with counsel. Particularly given the government's
acknowledgment that the basis for its allegations may be "misinformation"
disseminated by other detainees, 175 the government's position frustrates
institutional equity's effort to ensure that the detainee is not a false positive
wrongfully confined.
2. Adequacy of Existing Remedies
Analysis of the adequacy of existing remedies is more complex. One long-
term remedy involves a "transition-centered" re-framing of global strategy to
promote the investment of human capital in democratic, non-violent
institutions. Over time, re-framing policy in this fashion will do much to
marginalize transnational networks such as Al Qaeda.17 6 A second alternative
to indefinite detention of alleged enemy combatants is prosecution in civilian
courts under the provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA") of 1996 that bars "material support" of groups such as Al
172 Cf Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548-49 (1990)
(arguing that courts have used statutory interpretation to infuse immigration doctrine with
constitutional principles).
"I See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Padilla... has no
ability to make fact-based arguments because.., he has been held incommunicado at the
Consolidated Naval Brig .. "), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, 2004).
174 A "dirty bomb" is a conventional explosive device containing radioactive material.
When the device is detonated, the radioactive material spreads. Although a dirty bomb
lacks the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, which uses radioactive material to produce
the explosion itself, even a conventional device containing radioactive material can produce
significant physical harm and a substantial emotional and psychological impact on a
population. Id. at 573.
175 See Steve Fainaru, Padilla's Al Qaeda Ties Confirmed, Prosecutors Say, WASH.
POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A4 (quoting the government as acknowledging that "some of the
sources who provided information on Padilla may be trying to mislead the
government....").
176 Cf JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 35 (2002) (arguing that a multilateral approach by the
United States is the most effective approach to antiterrorism efforts); Koh, supra note 147,
at 342 (recommending multilateral approach); Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 153
(same).
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Qaeda that the Secretary of State has designated as terrorist organizations. 177
Violations of the AEDPA are punishable by a sentence of up to fifteen
years. 178 The prospect of such a sentence is a substantial incentive for a
defendant to plead guilty and cooperate with the government. 179 In other
cases, particularly those involving persons captured on a foreign battlefield, the
Executive also has the option of detaining such individuals as prisoners of war
("POWs") pending the termination of hostilities. A fourth alternative is
prosecution of an individual before a military tribunal for violations of the laws
of war.180
The transition policy, civilian prosecution, and POW options leave a
residual cohort of cases in which the "special circumstances"' 8' of
transnational violent networks' recruiting, discipline, and structure create
enduring danger to the public. Leaders such as Osama bin Laden exploit
sentiments of powerlessness and humiliation. They motivate their recruits with
a vision of authenticity that combines a yearning for a triumphalist past with a
call to exterminate people perceived as the "other."'1 82  The apocalyptic
117 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2002)
(defining "material support").
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
179 See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998) (analyzing the dynamics of plea bargaining); Peter
Margulies, Battered Bargaining: Domestic Violence and Plea Negotiation in the Criminal
Justice System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 153 (2001) [hereinafter Margulies,
Battered Bargaining] (same); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69
(1995) (same). Cf Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (observing,
in connection with a ruling that Padilla is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and assistance of
counsel regarding his unlawful combatant status, that extending process to Padilla might, as
with many criminal defendants facing trial, promote a realistic perspective, leading him to
"seek to better his lot by cooperating").
0 See infra Part IV.C (discussing judicial review of military tribunal determinations).
181 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) (discussing special
circumstances that justify the government's restraint of dangerous individuals).
182 See Ladan Boroumand & Roya Boroumand, Terror, Islam, and Democracy, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 5, 7-8 (tracing the ideological debt owed by theorists of violent
Islamism to western totalitarian movements, such as fascism and communism); cf JOHN
ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 20, 32 (2002) (referencing Islamic
strictures against killing noncombatants and Osama bin Laden's disregard of these rules);
KHALED ABou EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 205-09 (2001)
(analyzing arguments of jurists that persons who kill innocents in pursuit of political goals
lose entitlement to the consideration accorded rebels under Islamic teaching); FULLER, supra
note 15, at 60 (explaining that, along with the modern Islamics' individual interpretations of
religion, "erroneous and distorted understandings of Islam can emerge that can serve to
justify violence or even terror"). See generally CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 34 (2003) (discussing the role of "political entrepreneurs" who
"promote violence ... by activating boundaries, stories, and relations that have already
accumulated histories of violence; by connecting already violent actors with previously
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perspective instilled by such "authenticity entrepreneurs"' 83 generates
operational commitments potentially more enduring than the venality or
impulse that motivates ordinary wrongdoing. A transition-centered global
strategy will erode, but not eliminate, the ability of authenticity entrepreneurs
to recruit followers committed to sabotaging reform efforts through acts of
violence. 184 Moreover, for such committed operatives, a fifteen-year sentence
pursuant to a conviction in a civilian court may be insufficient for
rehabilitation. Similarly, the POW option, which expires upon the termination
of overt hostilities, fails to deal with the problems of operatives' intractability
or the geographic dispersion of command that further frustrates efforts to reach
and enforce peace agreements. 185 A construction of the war paradigm that
limited confinement to prisoner of war status would unfairly impose the risks
of such uncertainty on targets of transnational violence.
At this juncture, in consideration of alternative remedies, a bounded,
interstitial form of enemy combatant detention begins to seem plausible. For
the hardened cohort described above, where the evidence permits, 86 trial
before a military tribunal for violations of the law of war may be the most
appropriate alternative. In many cases, however, before commencing a
prosecution for violations of the law of war or turning to a civilian tribunal, the
transnational nature of the conduct alleged may require more time for
investigation. In addition, the public interest in preventing further attacks may
counsel the need for a period of time devoted solely to interrogation regarding
future threats. 187 An appropriately cabined form of enemy combatant detention
will provide the government with the flexibility necessary for meeting such
exigencies. 188  However, the Administration's assertion of unrestricted
nonviolent allies; by coordinating destructive campaigns; and by representing their
constituencies through threats of violence").
183 See Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 153.
"I See Andrew Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of
Extremist Violence, 56 INT'L ORG. 263, 264-65 (2002) (discussing extremist violence as a
means for discrediting moderates who wish to pursue nonviolent alternatives).
8I Cf Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 559 (1999) (discussing strategic advantages exploited by violent
transnational networks as compared with states).
86 See discussion infra Part IV.C. (discussing access to evidence by defendants before
military tribunals).
187 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (acknowledging
the government's interest in interrogating an alleged "unlawful combatant").
88 The same pragmatic analysis would apply in the context of the detention of material
witnesses before a grand jury. Federal law clearly provides for the detention of material
witnesses at trial. See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1971). The
Bacon court noted that the unavailability of witnesses during a criminal investigation can
undermine the justice system just as surely as a witness's unavailability at trial. Id. at 940.
Prior to authorizing detention, however, the court should ascertain whether a less intrusive
remedy, such as a noticed deposition, is appropriate in detention's stead. Id. at 943.
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authority to detain alleged enemy combatants undermines the gap-filling
rationale, threatening to transform such detention from the exception to the
rule.
3. Balancing the Hardships
The same pragmatic result emerges from the balance of hardships'
allocation of the costs of seeking clear statements from Congress. The
government's ability to address the exigencies of transnational violence
requires that courts read Congress's Joint Resolution authorizing force in the
aftermath of September 11 as providing a measure of implied authority to the
executive. 189
The mobility of transnational actors suggests the need for finding implied legislative
authority for the detention of material witnesses before a grand jury when no less restrictive
alternative serves the government's objectives. Transnational mobility makes it more
difficult for the government to fully investigate a pattern of wrongdoing. In addition, a
witness's transnational mobility allows him to evade a subpoena to testify by leaving the
territorial bounds of a particular nation when authorities commence an investigation.
Consider in this regard the case of Maher Hawash, whom the government held as a
material witness for five weeks prior to filing charges against him based on his arranging
with others to travel to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban and Al Qaeda. See Associated
Press, Oregon Man Pleads Guilty to Aiding the Taliban, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 2003, at A12.
Hawash pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide services to the Taliban and agreed to assist
the government if other charges were dropped. Id. In Hawash's case, the government had
to seek evidence from China regarding the defendants' stay in a hotel room with co-
defendants also allegedly en route to Afghanistan. Id. Confirming this information from
China surely took more time than investigating most domestic events. Hawash's trip to
China also demonstrated that he had both the capability and the inclination to leave the
country when the occasion arose. If the government represents to a court that information
from the witness is material to a grand jury investigation, it should have authority to detain
the witness for a limited period rather than risk his flight.
Courts considering statutory authority for detention of material witnesses before grand
juries after September 11 have split, with one court upholding the practice based on
precedent and experience and another making a somewhat strained semantic argument to
support a holding that the government lacked authority. Compare In re Application of the
United States for Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding
that the federal material witness statute applied to grand jury proceedings), with United
States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (asserting without reference to
the statute or legislative history that the statutory term, "criminal proceeding" governing
detention could only refer to an adversarial proceeding, not to an ex parte grand jury
proceeding). Legislative history supports the availability of detention in the grand jury
context. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 28 n.88, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3211
(citing Bacon, 449 F.2d at 939, for the proposition that "[a] grand jury investigation is a
'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of this section").
'9 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that joint resolutions
have "the force of law" under Article I of the Constitution (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 756 (1986))); cf Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (observing, in a decision
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The Joint Resolution is sufficiently broad to encompass a quantum of
implied authority, authorizing the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations, or persons. 190
Congress's authorization of "all necessary and appropriate force" to prevent
future acts of terrorism against the United States logically includes some kind
of restraint of persons such as the alleged "unlawful combatant" Jose Padilla,
whom the government asserts planned at Al Qaeda's command to obtain and
explode in the United States a "dirty bomb" containing radioactive material.' 9 1
However, the Joint Resolution does not stand alone but exists in conjunction
with an earlier enactment that cabins the Executive's implied authority. The
earlier statute, known as § 4001(a), provides that, "no citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained... by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress."' 192 While the earlier statute does not mention war or foreign
upholding the use of military tribunals, that "unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention").
190 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
191 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 726 (2d Cir. 2003) (Wesley, J., dissenting)
(arguing in favor of executive power to detain suspected enemy combatants, even if U.S.
citizens, in the interest of national security). But see id. at 722 (Pooler & Parker, JJ.)
(majority holding that the Joint Resolution does not provide authorization for detention of
alleged unlawful combatants). Cf William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted
Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 667, 679-80
(2003) (discussing "customary constitutional authority" for exigent measures based on
inferences drawn from legislative inaction or ambiguity).
192 See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), discussed in Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy Comment, A Small
Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. 4001(a) and the Detention of United States Citizen
"Enemy Combatants", 112 YALE L.J. 961 (2003). Bryant and Tobias find other support in
the omission by Congress in enacting the USA PATRIOT Act of authority sought by the
Attorney General to indefinitely detain aliens without immigration or other charges upon a
finding that national security called for such a measure. See Bryant & Tobias, supra note
96, at 386-91. The USA PATRIOT Act allows the Attorney General to detain an alien
without charges for up to seven days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(5). However, as Judge
Mukasey notes in Padilla, this omission is of limited interpretive significance. Padilla, 233
F. Supp. 2d at 596. It certainly reflects Congress's wariness about wholesale Korematsu-
style detentions. Courts, however, should not read legislative inaction here as precluding
the exercise of executive authority under the Joint Resolution to detain unlawful combatants
where the government has made a particularized proffer supporting its contention that the
detainee sought on behalf of a foreign power or entity to injure persons and property in the
United States. See id. ("The cited portion of the Patriot Act applies to persons as to whom
there is alleged to be far less reason for suspicion than there is as to Padilla.").
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affairs, the abuse of the government's authority to prevent espionage or
sabotage was a driving factor in the promulgation of the law.193
Courts should read § 4001(a) as cabining, but not absolutely precluding, the
detention of alleged unlawful combatants. Section 4001(a) does not require
express authorization by Congress of future detentions and, therefore, does not
preclude a subsequent implied authorization such as that arguably provided by
Congress in the Joint Resolution. In the main, the legislative deliberations
about § 4001(a) looked backward, condemning the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War 11.194 One can read the statute as barring such
wholesale detentions, while still permitting a future Congress to impliedly
authorize a more limited form of detention based on a particularized fear of a
catastrophic attack. The close relationship between preventing such an attack
and the Executive's obligation to protect the safety of people within the United
States also distinguishes the unlawful combatant case from the more
"attenuated" claim of necessity underlying President Truman's failed attempt
to seize the steel mills in the Steel Seizure Case.19 5
Buttressing this reading is the effect of time and experience. Section
4001(a) was passed in 1971, reflecting the conventional wisdom of the more
than 150 years when civilians within the continental United States were safe
from foreign attack.196 Tragically, the events of September 11, 2001 made that
assumption obsolete. In their more sanguine world, the sponsors of § 4001(a)
believed that government surveillance of possible wrongdoers would suffice to
avert catastrophic attacks. 197 They did not have the benefit of viewing the
world after September 11, which showed that the presence of a number of the
193 See H.R. REP. No. 92-116, at 1 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1435
(expressing "doubt about the constitutionality of the old act because it called for detention if
there were reasonable grounds to believe that such persons probably will engage in, or
probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage").
194 See, e.g., 117 CoNG. REc. H31,537 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1971) (remarks of Rep.
Railsback); see also Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721-22 (listing remarks of other sponsors).
195 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 727 (Wesley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(arguing that the tenuous link between President Truman's action and conduct of the war in
Korea contrasts with the facts in Padilla, in which "the President's authority is directly tied
to his responsibilities as Commander in Chief'); ef Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11
"National Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges' Decision-Making, 81 OR. L.
REv. 985, 1025-30 (2002) (discussing judicial efforts to reconcile exigency and due
process).
196 SeeYALE CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF GLOBALIZATION, THE AGE OF TERROR vii, x (Strobe
Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds. 2001) (The losses from the September 11 attacks were
"nearly thirty times greater than what Timothy McVeigh, a homegrown madman, had
inflected on Oklahoma City in 1995, and about double what three hundred Japanese
bombers left in their wake at Pearl Harbor.... This was something new under the sun.").
197 See 117 CONG. REc. H31,551-52 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1971) (remarks of Rep.
Railsback) (quoting former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover).
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attackers' names on a "watch list" had not derailed their plans. 198 Surveillance
standing alone can be both over- and under-inclusive, affecting people and
groups who are innocent of wrongdoing, 199 while failing to deter those
determined to injure innocents. The obsolescence of the assumptions made by
the sponsors of § 4001(a) counsels against reading the statute in an absolutist
fashion to preclude any form of unlawful combatant detention.20 0 Section
4001(a), however, continues to stand for the proposition that any detention
must be carefully tailored.
Further support for constraining the government's authority flows from
concerns for equality, integrity, and the reduction of opportunity costs built
into the default rules for statutory interpretation. Depriving an alleged
unlawful combatant of the right to be heard and to assistance of counsel would
spark tensions with both due process guarantees and the commitment to justice
and fairness embodied in the statutes conferring jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus.20 1 The threat to institutional integrity is magnified by the in
terrorem effect of the detentions on defendants in the criminal justice system,
who cannot discount the possibility that, unless they plead guilty, the
government will also detain them indefinitely as enemy combatants.2 0 2 The
likelihood that such a free-floating detention warrant will be used largely
against Muslims also prompts equality concerns. 20 3 Finally, courts should
consider the tension between the executive's assertion of untrammeled
authority and the provisions of the Geneva Convention that suggest a
presumption of POW status for detainees pending a determination by a
'1 See Patrick J. McDonnell & Russell Carotlo, An Easy Entry for Attackers;
Immigration Flaws Garner Attention as Authorities Track the Sept. 11 Hijackers'
Movements Through the United States, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al (observing that,
even though two of the September 11 hijackers' names were on a government watch list,
they were able to enter the United States and carry out their plans for attack).
199 See Fisher, supra note 168 (arguing for high standard regulating government
surveillance of religious groups).
200 For useful discussions of statutory obsolescence, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 131-35 (1982); ESKRIDGE, supra note 104, at 50-57; cf
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv.
885, 917-20 (2003) (discussing empirical questions regarding choice between judges and
legislatures in responding to problems of statutory obsolescence).
201 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969), and quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 1651(a) (2000)), cert.
granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, 2004).
202 See Lichtblau, supra note 75 (discussing how Shafal Mosed decided to plead guilty to
offering "material support" to Al Qaeda after the government suggested he could be
declared an enemy combatant and detained indefinitely or be charged with treason and
executed).
203 See Akram & Johnson, supra note 56, at 328-29 (discussing the government's
authority to detain suspected terrorists under the USA PATRIOT Act).
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"competent tribunal. ' 20 4  This tension with international law creates
opportunity costs for the United States's efforts to elicit international
cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts. 205 In light of these fundamental concerns,
courts should construe the authority to detain under the. Joint Resolution
narrowly.
4. Equitable Tailoring for Unlawful Combatants
Equitable tailoring of executive authority to detain alleged unlawful
combatants is the most appropriate way to minimize false positives, balance
hardships, and fit exigent procedures into the gaps in existing remedies.
Considerations of institutional competence favor courts performing this
tailoring function, instead of leaving a void for the legislature to fill. As the
Supreme Court noted in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, courts have the ability to draw
exceptions narrowly to respond to "the necessities of the particular case"
without undermining overarching norms. 20 6
In the unlawful combatant situation, courts can tailor the scope, manner, and
duration of detention to reflect both the exigencies of national security and the
transcendent values of due process. In contrast, Congress, if required to
legislate expressly, may be tempted to fashion an overbroad authorization that
will grant the Executive excessive authority.20 7 Such a broad grant may
require subsequent tailoring by the Court to comply with due process
204 See Geneva Convention, supra note 154, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-25, 75 U.N.T.S. at
141 (requiring a trial before a competent tribunal for suspected combatants); cf Lewis,
supra note 3, at 261 (discussing the Geneva Convention); Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to
Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
503, 520-27 (2003) (discussing international law basis for judicial review of detention).
205 Cf Paust, supra note 204, at 512-13 (stating that the Geneva Convention allows a
state to detain persons within its own territory when such persons are "definitely suspected
of... [engaging] in activities hostile to the security of the State," such detention is
"absolutely necessary," and the detaining authority provides for judicial review) (citing
Geneva Convention, supra note 154, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-25, 75 U.N.T.S. at 141).
206 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
207 This was the case with the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917),
enacted after the United States' entry into World War I, which, inter alia, made it illegal to
"make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere" with the military
effectiveness of the United States or "to promote the success of its enemies." Cf Geoffrey
R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 335 (2003) (discussing Judge Hand's development of the basis for modem First
Amendment doctrine in his construction of the Espionage Act in Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), which was not
followed until decades later). The same overbreadth characterized the Act of March 21,
1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173, which made it illegal to "enter, remain in, leave, or commit any
act in a military area or military zone prescribed.., by the Secretary of War," which the
government used, along with an Executive Order, as authority for the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II.
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guarantees. 20 8 Alternatively, Congress may experience paralysis, finding itself
unable to act despite the exigency of the questions involved. The more
efficient path to institutional dialog would be to permit the Court to take an
initial assay at the matter, which Congress can then modify if it sees fit.
The prudence of this path fits the pragmatic account of institutional
architecture offered by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case.209  In
grappling with the needs posed by a particular situation, courts can exercise
equitable discretion to promote a "workable government. '210 Absent a clear
statement from Congress that constrains equitable discretion, courts should
read a legislative enactment such as the Joint Resolution to reflect legislative
acknowledgment of the courts' tailoring role.
21
'
This equitable tailoring would embody the Court's observation that "strong
procedural protections" typically accompany grants of authority to detain
individuals for substantial periods.2 12  In the enemy combatant context,
208 See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (interpreting the Act of March 21, 1942
in light of constitutional concerns to prohibit the detention of Japanese-Americans who were
concededly not security risks).
209 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [The Steel Seizure Case], 343 U.S.
579, 584-85 (1952) (exercising equitable discretion in deciding that the President had
overstepped his executive war powers).
210 See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding that "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government").
211 See Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329-30 (holding that ambiguities in statutes should be
resolved in favor of exercising equitable discretion). Cf DWORKIN, supra note 40, at 348-49
(arguing that a court should retain discretion to interpret a statute in light of the shifting
"story" of people, processes, and institutions affecting the statute's implementation);
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 200, at 932-35 (arguing that the inference of a legislative
grant of interpretive discretion to courts should hinge on an empirical view of institutional
competence in each case).
212 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (limiting preventative detention
only to the most dangerous detainees and only when coupled with additional procedural
protections); cf Martin, supra note 65, at 123-25 (discussing the importance of using
judicial review in tailoring assertions of governmental authority to detain immigrants).
In light of the exigency of the unlawful combatant cases, courts should allow the
government to meet its burden by presenting "some evidence" that the detainee was "like
the German saboteurs in Quirin, engaged in a mission against the United States on behalf of
an enemy with whom the United States is at war." Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564,
608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, 2004). To satisfy this
standard, the government should be able to introduce affidavits by officials with knowledge
of the basis for detaining the petitioner, even if that knowledge is not first-hand. Id. at 609
(considering the Declaration of Defense Department official Michael Mobbs). Producing
witnesses with first-hand information at a hearing contesting the detention of an alleged
enemy combatant could require the appearance of combat personnel, which the Supreme
Court has indicated would interfere with executive prerogatives. See Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950) (detailing the costs to command prestige and military
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protections provided either by statute or via habeas corpus should include an
individualized evidentiary hearing and the right to representation by counsel.
213
An institutional equity court should also impose limits on the duration of
detention.214 The imposition of a time limit reflects institutional equity's debt
to both the flexibility of habeas jurisprudence and the "public law" tradition of
injunctive relief against overreaching agencies of government. 215 A time limit
resources of requiring first-hand information). Although permitting the government to rely
on hearsay should engender concern, the probability and gravity of false positives are
diminished by safeguards, such as the ability of the detainee, assisted by an attorney, to
present evidence to counter the government's allegations and the presumptive six-month
time limit institutional equity would impose on unlawful combatant detention. Cf Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (analyzing procedural due process by considering the
state's interest, the interest of the individual, and the risk of error).
213 Without these rights, the detainee effectively loses the "opportunity to present and
contest facts" ensured by the habeas corpus statute. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Padilla in the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, another alleged
unlawful combatant. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh 'g and reh 'g en
banc denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004).
It viewed the evidence in the case as entailing Hamdi's concession that he had been
apprehended on the battlefield. Id. at 460. Armed with this putative concession, the Fourth
Circuit asserted that no relevant facts remained in dispute. Id. at 471. Unfortunately, as
Judges Luttig and Motz argued in their separate dissents to the Fourth Circuit's denial of a
rehearing, the majority's characterization of the facts reflects judicial convenience more
than accuracy. See Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 358, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, Motz, JJ.,
dissenting). Because of the respondent's refusal to make Hamdi available, neither the
district court nor the Fourth Circuit heard from Hamdi at all. Id. at 361 (observing that the
court relied solely on the petition of Hamdi's next friend as the basis for its dismissal).
They heard only from his attorneys and next friend, who made ambiguous representations to
the court about Hamdi's whereabouts at the time of his capture. Id. at 346 (interpreting
attorneys and next friend as conceding at most that Hamdi was in Afghanistan). It is
furthermore far from clear that any statements by attorneys or a next friend should bind
Hamdi himself, especially when the government has also refused them access to Hamdi. Id.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is of questionable applicability.
24 Jose Padilla, for example, should have the opportunity to contest the government's
assertions that he was seeking to assemble a "dirty bomb," access to an attorney to help him
in this task, and-upon an appropriate proffer-access with reasonable conditions to
persons, such as the Al Qaeda upper-echelon figure Abu Zubaydah, who may be able to
confirm Padilla's lack of involvement in such a scheme.
215 See generally Fiss, supra note 135 (discussing injunctions against prisons, psychiatric
hospitals, school systems, etc.); Chayes, supra note 112 (same); Margulies, New Class
Action, supra note 112 (discussing issues of democracy and dialogue within plaintiff class in
public law proceedings). But see SANDLER & SCHOENEROD, supra note 112 (criticizing
public law relief as impinging on the prerogatives of state and local governments). Faced
with school desegregation, foster care, and other cases with a "polycentric" configuration of
interests, agendas, and social facts-including demagogic politicians, recalcitrant
legislatures, and conflicting budget priorities---courts sought to enforce legal rights by
fashioning specific remedies. See Chayes, supra note 112, at 1310-13. Relief included
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on enemy combatant detentions serves a public law purpose by balancing the
political and bureaucratic momentum of exigency 16  with increased
accountability for both the executive and legislative branches of government.
Time limits also accommodate the special demands of transnational
investigation and negotiation, 217 while ensuring that government uses detention
bussing and the creation of magnet schools in the desegregation context, standards for
hygiene and medical care in prisons, and community placement for persons in psychiatric
hospitals and developmental centers. In some cases, the efforts of courts were successful.
See Margulies, New Class Action, supra note 112, at 516-17 (discussing litigation to provide
community placements for persons with mental retardation that skillfully marshaled family
involvement, political support for increased community expenditures, and efficacious
technology such as motorized wheelchairs and assistive communication devices); cf N.Y.
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 768-70 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) (issuing a preliminary injunction requiring Willowbrook Developmental Center to
raise the level of care to meet national standards). In other areas, success was incomplete,
stymied in part by the polycentric agendas courts had hoped to master. See Margulies, New
Class Action, supra note 112, at 514-15 (discussing failures of remedies seeking community
placement for persons with mental illness, including homelessness and
"transinstitutionalization" from psychiatric hospitals into more restrictive institutions such
as jails and prisons). In most cases, however, judicial decrees provided concrete
improvements in institutions that had previously run by administrative fiat. See MALCOLM
M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 365-79 (1998) (discussing successes of judicial
decrees in improving hygiene, medical care, and other aspects of institutional life). See
generally Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 639 (1993) (analyzing successes and challenges of institutional reform litigation).
216 See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 188-92 (describing how pressure to intern Japanese-
Americans on the west coast in the weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor started at the state
and local level and soon won over federal officials).
27 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. While some element of arbitrariness is inevitable in
determining the appropriate amount of time allowed for transnational investigation, one can
resort to Supreme Court precedent as a guide. In Zadvydas, the Court observed that a period
of six months was appropriate as a presumptive maximum period of detention for aliens
with final orders of deportation. Id. According to the Court, the six-month period gave the
government sufficient time to do the transnational work involved in securing the
cooperation of another country in accepting the alien in order to effect the alien's removal.
Id. The transnational work involved in ascertaining an individual detainee's terrorist
connections could be performed within a comparable period. Id. Indeed, the government's
experience in ruling out terrorist connections among the aliens detained in the aftermath of
September It suggests that in many cases it could perform the work in a shorter period.
Inspector General Report, supra note 6. As in Zadvydas, the government would be able to
seek an extension of the six-month period in cases where reasonable progress was being
made toward achieving an objective relevant to the purposes of the detention, such as
interrogation of the detainee regarding plans for future violence. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701
(admitting that six months is a brief period, and allowing courts to grant extended detention
when appropriate). But see Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (asserting that the
Administration's detention of alleged unlawful combatants matched Justice Jackson's first
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as an interstitial measure, not as a permanent escape-hatch from fora with
greater procedural safeguards.
218
Moreover, time limits reduce the impact of the lack of coherent standards
for release from enemy combatant detention. This lack of standards would
otherwise transform enemy combatant detention into a de facto life sentence,
triggering substantial due process concerns. 21 9 A delegation of such scope
Steel Seizure scenario of congruence between executive and legislative authority; declining
to impose a time limit on detention, while requiring an evidentiary hearing and assistance of
counsel).
218 While the Court also suggested that persons suspected of terrorism might present
special challenges to this model, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695, in enemy combatant cases,
the government would have other avenues available upon the expiration of time limits that
were not applicable in Zadvydas. In Zadvydas, the government was "out of options"
regarding legal bases for exerting control over the petitioners. The petitioners had already
been convicted of criminal offenses and had served their time. See id. at 680. In enemy
combatant cases, in contrast, the government still has the option of trying the detainees in
civilian court, bringing detainees before military tribunals, or commencing immigration
proceedings. See, for example, the case of the one current alien detainee, Ali Saleh Kahlah
Al-Marri. Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008-09 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (dismissing
petition for habeas corpus on venue grounds).
219 In cases authorizing indefinite detention, such as those involving sex offenders, see,
e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), decisionmakers could apply standards of
clinical and professional judgment to measure a detainee's progress toward release. See
also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-14 (2002) (discussing the importance of a sex
offender's ability to control his behavior). But see id. at 423-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's standard is too amorphous). Cf Eric S. Janus & Wayne A.
Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent
Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 367 (2003) (discussing the Crane Court's heightened
scrutiny of the fit between the rationale for and the results of confinement). See generally
Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV.
113 (1996) (discussing empirical and legal bases for predictions of dangerousness
underlying detention that is largely preventive in nature); Christopher Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984) (same). Clinicians and peers of
the sex offender could gauge changes in behavior, such as a lack of interest in child
pornography demonstrated consistently over time. In addition, in the sex offender context,
indefinite detention was incidental to the workings of established adjudicatory regimes, such
as the criminal justice system, and was initiated either after the filing of criminal charges or
upon the completion of a sentence after a conviction.
Neither of these factors hold true in the enemy combatant context. Clinicians and other
professionals face methodological, normative, and institutional obstacles in developing and
implementing reliable criteria for enemy combatants' progress toward release. Attention
will inevitably focus not merely on the detainee's day-to-day interactions, but also on the
detainee's expressed ideology. Even if evidence existed that professionals could "treat"
ideology as they would a typical clinical disorder, the training transnational networks give
their recruits on "gaming the system" would create substantial doubts about the reliability of
expressed ideology as a guide. See Makiya & Mneimneh, supra note 11, at 18. In addition,
seeking to alter a political and religious ideology as an aspect of confinement elicits images
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should require express legislative authority, given the constitutional problems
raised by indefinite detention220 and the existing legislation purporting to limit
the federal government's use of the practice.221 To require any less would, as
Justice Jackson noted in the Steel Seizure Case, license legislative lassitude
and executive "usurpation. '222
By failing to impose time limits, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi committed the
error the Supreme Court avoided in the Steel Seizure Case when it enjoined the
Executive from seizing the steel mills; 223 it treated the war power as unitary
and authorized sweeping executive action at home to match the scope of
executive action abroad.2 24 In contrast, imposing a time limit remands the
matter to Congress, 225 obliging legislators to consider whether breaking alleged
terrorists justifies bending long-standing commitments to fairness. By granting
the Executive a measure of flexibility, but requiring express legislative
authority for more drastic departures from due process norms, institutional
equity preserves the balance between the three branches and promotes the
of a Clockwork Orange brand of behavior modification that is perilously incompatible with
commitments to freedom of thought in a constitutional democracy. Cf Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992) (invalidating the detention of a person diagnosed as having an
"antisocial personality," but not mental illness, and warning against indefinite "confinement
for dangerousness"). The prospect of blame for harm caused by a released detainee would
also impede implementation of any protocol professionals could devise. Cf Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 29-30 (1998) (discussing "hindsight
bias" that makes harm, such as a terrorist attack, more predictable in retrospect). These
issues dovetail with enemy combatant detention's lack of anchoring in established,
legislatively authorized frameworks of adjudication to create a unique set of dangers to
accountability.
220 See Sunstein, supra note 104, at 338 (highlighting the nondelegation doctrine's role in
assigning Congress sole power to authorize the compromise of fundamental rights and
interests). Indeed, in contexts not involving the war and foreign affairs implications of
terrorism, the Court has struck down indefinite detention based on dangerousness. See
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)
(upholding pretrial detention under the federal Bail Reform Act of defendants accused of
racketeering, drug trafficking, and other serious offenses, predicated in part on a functional
time limit on detention); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266-69 (1984) (upholding the
pretrial detention of juveniles based on the state's parens patriae interest in protecting
juveniles from the consequences of all criminal activity, including their own).
221 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000); see also supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text
(discussing § 4001 (a)); cf Vladeck, supra note 192 (same).
222 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [The Steel Seizure Case], 343 U.S.
579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 589.
224 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 474-75 (4th Cir. 2003), reh'g and reh'g en banc
denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004).
225 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 104, at 283-84 (discussing clear statement rules as devices
for remand to the legislature for further guidance).
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deliberation and debate at the core of constitutionalism. 226
B. The Terrorism Defendant's Rights to Investigate and Present
a Defense at Trial
The harmonization of values reflected in institutional equity also played a
large role in United States v. Moussaoui,227 in which the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia weighed the right of a criminal defendant
accused of terrorist acts to a fair trial against the government's interest in
interrogating Al Qaeda detainees. In Moussaoui, the district court struck a
compromise between fair trial rights and national security interests that, at first
blush, seems to embody the reconciliation of interests contemplated by
institutional equity.228 Closer analysis demonstrates, however, that the district
court's decision achieves a surface harmony between interests by unduly
discounting the defendant's rights.
The district court's starting point is unimpeachable: criminal defendants
have rights, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, to investigate the factual
basis for the government's charges. 2 29 The government cannot impair that
right through unreasonable restrictions on the activities of the defendant or his
representatives. 230  When the defendant's investigation leads to possible
witnesses in the government's custody or under its control, the government is
generally obliged to make those witnesses available under appropriate
conditions. 23' The court may sanction the government for hindering
investigation necessary to the defendant's presentation of a case at trial.232
Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested prior to September 11, 2001 while
attending a flight school in Minnesota and charged with six counts of
conspiracy. 233 Four of those counts reflect the government's claims that
Moussaoui was the "twentieth hijacker" slated to participate in the September
226 See generally Sunstein, supra note 104 (discussing the rationale of canons of statutory
interpretation). Notwithstanding a Supreme Court decision tailoring the scope and
circumstances of unlawful combatant detention, subsequent legislative action codifying
these safeguards would be appropriate to promote predictability in the legal system.
227 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003).
228 Id. at 481 (accepting as well reasoned the national security interests argued by the
Executive, and balancing them against the interests of the accused).
229 See id.; see also Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651 (2d Cir. 1995)
(expounding on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to zealous representation).
231 Simels, 48 F.3d at 651.
231 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957) (requiring the government to
disclose the identity of its informant).
232 Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1452
(1984) (arguing that the use of a federal court's supervisory power is appropriate to address
violations of specific constitutional provisions).
233 Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
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11 attacks. 234 Moussaoui, who is representing himself but also has stand-by
counsel, asserts that he is a member of Al Qaeda and that he was attending
flight school in connection with plans for a future action abroad.235 Moussaoui
has submitted a factual proffer supporting his contention that Ramzi bin al-
Shibh, his contact with Al Qaeda who was captured in Pakistan in the second
half of 2002, can provide evidence confirming his story. 236 The government,
which has been interrogating bin al-Shibh since his capture, has declined to
produce him despite the court's order that it do SO. 23 7  To sanction the
government for its ongoing refusal to produce bin al-Shibh, the district court
dismissed the four counts in the indictment related to the September 11 attacks,
precluded the presentation of any evidence or argument regarding the attacks,
and barred the government from seeking the death penalty. 238
The district court's opinion, while not expressly citing the elements of the
institutional equity standard, nonetheless tracks those elements closely.
Avoiding false positives is a central concern of the court, which notes the
"need for reliability" in death penalty cases. 2 39  Moussaoui's proffer
demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that bin al-Shibh could provide
evidence demonstrating that Moussaoui was at best a "minor participant" in the
charged offenses without "direct involvement in, or knowledge of, the
planning or execution" of the September 11 attacks. 240 For the court, allowing
Moussaoui's trial on charges related to September 11 without offering
Moussaoui a genuine opportunity to rebut those charges would create an
unacceptable risk that the jury's verdict on both culpability and penalty would
"be predicated [not] on what the defendant, himself, actually did,. . . [but] on
what he may have wanted to do or on what his alleged co-conspirators were
able to accomplish on their own. 241
The court's ruling, together with its earlier decisions directing the
234 Id.
235 Id. at 481; United States v. Moussaoui, No. Cr-01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *1
(E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003).
236 Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21263699, at *1.
237 Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
238 Id. at 486-87.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 485. In addition, the government's own filings in other terrorism cases
demonstrate some doubt about its evidence, acknowledging the possibility that some of the
information it has received from Al Qaeda higher-ups may be misinformation. See Fainaru,
supra note 175 (quoting the government as acknowledging that "some of the sources who
provided information ... may be trying to mislead the government"). Moreover, the
Administration's recent record on issues it considers to be related to terrorism, such as
intelligence justifying military intervention in Iraq, does not inspire confidence. See, e.g.,
Christopher Marquis, How Powerful Can 16 Words Be?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, § 4, at
5 (discussing the controversy over the unsubstantiated claim in the President's State of the
Union address that Saddam Hussein sought to buy uranium in Africa).
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government to produce bin al-Shibh for depositions to be taken by the
defendant, also implicitly addresses the adequacy of remedies in this case from
the standpoint of both the government and the defendant. The government
asserted that precluding Moussaoui's access to bin al-Shibh was necessary to
avoid interference with antiterrorism efforts. 242 The district court, however,
aided by technology, fashioned conditions on defendant's access to bin al-
Shibh that safeguarded the public interest. For example, it suggested using a
video connection to question bin al-Shibh so as to avoid transporting him to the
United States,243 which might be burdensome and disruptive.
244
In addressing the adequacy of remedies from the defendant's perspective,
however, the court's analysis seems more convenient than convincing.
Sanctions imposed by the trial court should be both proportionate to the nature
and scope of the government's misconduct 245 and sufficient to counter the risk
of prejudice to the defendant. 246 In Moussaoui, the court's dismissal of certain
charges and exclusion of evidence related to the attacks of September 11,
coupled with its decision to eliminate the availability of the death penalty,
appear to be a proportionate response to the unfairness of forcing the defendant
to respond to charges without needed evidence. However, the court's
sanctions leave a substantial residue of prejudice for the defendant to confront
at trial regarding the remaining counts. In the post-September 11 climate of
fear and mistrust, the government may need only enough evidence to pass the
test of legal sufficiency to persuade a jury to convict. The reams of publicity
242 See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 513 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[A]ccess to the
enemy combatant witness will have devastating consequences for national security and
foreign relations."), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003), and reh 'g and reh "g en
banc denied, 336 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003).
243 See Philip Shenon, Justice Department Seeking to Disallow Terrorist Interview, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2003, at A12 (reporting on the judge's order providing for video
conferencing).
244 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950) (detailing the costs and
difficulties of having the government produce witnesses connected to security operations).
245 See United States v. Garrett, 238 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding preclusion of
twenty-five government witnesses as sanction for the untimely submission of documents
constituted an abuse of discretion).
246 Cf United States v. Brown, 327 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a curative
instruction given by the court was inadequate to address prejudice created by the
prosecutor's improper closing argument). See generally United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
30, 32 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). In Burr, Chief Justice Marshall, presiding over the
trial of Aaron Burr for treason during the administration of Thomas Jefferson, analyzed
Jefferson's attempts to withhold portions of a letter material to the case but allegedly
containing material that was sensitive from a national security standpoint. Marshall
observed that, "either party may require the other to produce books or writings in their
possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue. In this respect courts of
law are invested with the power of a court of chancery [i.e., equity], and if the order be
disobeyed... judgment ... may be entered against [the noncomplying party]." United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
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about Moussaoui, some of which has been inaccurate, 247 along with
Moussaoui's own admissions of Al Qaeda membership and sympathies may in
effect shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
In light of these concerns, only specific and concrete evidence of innocence
of the kind the district court found that bin al-Shibh may have been able to
provide regarding the dismissed charges 248 offers Moussaoui a decent chance
at a fair trial on the remaining counts. The court's treatment of these concerns
seems perfunctory at best. The court's sole reference to the problem is its
assertion that, having dismissed the counts that could trigger the death penalty,
it was "no longer satisfied that testimony... [from bin al-Shibh] would be
material to the defense. '249 The court, however, offered no analysis to support
its conclusion,250 which seems inconsistent with the overall logic of the ruling
stressing the importance of bin al-Shibh's testimony. 25'
The court's balance-of-hardships analysis is similarly incomplete. The
adverse effects to institutional integrity of permitting the government to limit
the evidence gathered by the defense extend well beyond the Moussaoui case.
For example, courts would be hard pressed to deny the government a similar
dispensation in the burgeoning number of prosecutions for "material support"
of terrorist organizations under the AEDPA. 252 Here, as elsewhere, even the
247 See Baynes, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing some popular misconceptions, such as
the widely-held view that Moussaoui expressed interest in learning to fly an aircraft, but not
in taking off or landing).
248 See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003) (observing
the unfairness of requiring Moussaoui to defend himself against charges while the
government denied him "the ability to present testimony from witnesses who could assist
him in contradicting those accusations").
249 Id.
250 See id. (giving no rationale for disregarding the defendant's need for the witness's
testimony).
251 The court's reasoning may have been that bin al-Shibh's testimony would be
exculpatory only on the counts relating to the September 11 attacks and not on the
remaining counts. As to the remaining counts, bin al-Shibh may have provided inculpatory
information, for example, by confirming that Moussaoui was working with Al Qaeda on
future terrorist missions. Since such information would not buttress Moussaoui's ability to
rebut the remaining charges, it is arguably not "material" to the defense.
This analysis ignores the advantage a competent defense lawyer could gain from using
bin al-Shibh's testimony regarding Moussaoui's lack of involvement in the attacks to
undermine the government's case on the remaining charges. Suppose, for example, that bin
al-Shibh testified that Moussaoui was not selected for the September 1 I attacks because he
was not deemed sufficiently stable to cope with the complexity of the mission. A competent
defense lawyer would argue that a jury could infer from bin al-Shibh's testimony that Al
Qaeda would not trust Moussaoui with a future mission of any importance. This inference
would undermine the government's case on the remaining charges, rendering bin al-Shibh's
testimony material in that context as well.
152 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2000)
(defining material support as "currency or other financial securities, financial services,
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possibility that the government might effectively veto access to relevant
evidence would exert an in terrorem effect on defendants, encouraging guilty
pleas on weak prosecution evidence and reducing courts to the ministerial role
of rubber-stamping charging decisions by prosecutors.
The government's hardships are far less compelling than the prejudice to the
defendant or the threats to the integrity of the legal system that could result
from continuing the prosecution. Requiring the defendant, as in Moussaoui, to
make a specific proffer regarding the relevance of the information sought253
minimizes the ability of a defendant to secure strategic advantage by
frivolously seeking access to a witness in government custody. Moreover,
given the conditions the court imposed on the defendant's access to bin al-
Shibh, the government need only make a generic argument about disrupting
interrogation. 254 Finally, dismissal would not be unduly harsh on the facts
here, since the government acknowledged it had notice that this remedy would
be a possible consequence of its decision to decline to make bin al-Shibh
available.255 Deciding against dismissal, the court cited its unwillingness to
require the government to write off the "unprecedented investment of both
human and material resources in this case. '256 Such reluctance ignores what
the court found abundantly clear with respect to the charges carrying the death
penalty: the government's predicament was a product not of necessity but of its
own intransigence. 257
Moreover, the sanctions imposed by the court do not sufficiently reflect the
balance of hardships for the defendant. Although barring the death penalty in
the case does reduce the gravity of harm, potential hardships persist,
particularly because the remaining charges carry the possibility of a life
sentence.258 As noted above, the court fails to explain why bin al-Shibh's
lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and
other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials").
253 See Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (finding that the defense made "sufficient
showings" of the relevance of bin al-Shibh's testimony).
254 Indeed, at least one other court, discussing access of a military detainee in the United
States to his attorney, has characterized as "conjecture" the government's contention that
consultation with an attorney would compromise interrogation of the detainee. See Padilla
v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb.
20, 2004).
255 See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 515-16 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the district court's sanction of the government was necessary to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the appellate court).
256 See Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
257 Id. at 486-87 (striking the government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and
observing that the government's "refusal to comply" with court orders regarding access to
witnesses triggered the court's sanction).
258 Id. at 487 (acknowledging that "[t]he defendant remains exposed to possible
sentences of life imprisonment").
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testimony is any less relevant to these charges. Taking the death penalty off
the table does not obviate the hardship caused by a life sentence based upon an
erroneous conviction.
An analysis closer to the heart of institutional equity would have focused on
two factors in determining the balance of hardships. First, the defendant must
make a specific proffer regarding the relevance of the evidence sought.
Second, the imposition of reasonable conditions on access to the detained
witness must be sufficient to vindicate the government's legitimate national
security concerns. In Moussaoui, both standards were met. At that juncture,
permitting the government to bar access to evidence irremediably taints
subsequent proceedings whether the maximum sentence attendant upon
conviction is death or life.
Considering the likelihood of false positives, the adequacy of existing
remedies for both the government and the defendant, and the balance of
hardships, the government's failure to provide access to a crucial witness
requires dismissal of all of the government's charges against Moussaoui. 259
By stopping short of this remedy, the district court in Moussaoui goes through
the motions of institutional equity but misses its core. A less equivocal
commitment is necessary to put exigency in its place.
C. Access to Evidence in Military Tribunals
The district court's compromise in Moussaoui may have been in part a
response to the government's hints that dismissal of all charges against
Moussaoui would have led to proceedings against Moussaoui in a military
tribunal. 260 The Supreme Court has indicated in Ex parte Quirin that the
259 The government also has argued that the court has no jurisdiction to rule on
Moussaoui's access to bin al-Shibh, whom the government is holding outside United States
territory. This argument, however, is also unpersuasive. Precedent makes clear that the
relevant jurisdictional fact here is not the location of the witness, but the location of the
defendant. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790 (1950) (holding that the Court
lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition brought by individuals apprehended and tried by
military commissions outside the United States); see also Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition
brought on behalf of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba); cf Paul Schiff
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311,459-73 (2002) (arguing
that the jurisdictional distinction between cases within U.S. territory and cases outside that
territory has been rendered obsolete by technology's eclipse of geography). The defendant
in Moussaoui is concededly within the territorial United States-indeed, the government
apprehended him here and kept him here with immigration and, ultimately, criminal
charges. 282 F. Supp. 2d at 483. The court may lack jurisdiction to order the government to
produce the witness held extraterritorially on pain of contempt. The location of the
defendant and the proceeding, however, confer jurisdiction upon the court to take
appropriate measures, including dismissal of the charges, to avoid prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the government's position.
260 See Shenon, supra note 74 (indicating judicial awareness that dismissal of
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framers did not intend to disturb the specialized set of procedures relating to
prosecutions of violations of the law of war.261 Under Quirin, therefore, the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to proceedings in military tribunals, which
are conducted without a jury. 2 62 Without safeguards to serve in the Sixth
Amendment's stead, a dismissal of the charges against a terrorism defendant in
a civilian court would become merely an occasion for the government to
conveniently exit to another tribunal where it could work its will more
effectively.
Institutional equity would not preclude the establishment of military
tribunals for the adjudication of alleged violations of the laws of war.263
Military tribunals of appropriately tailored jurisdiction are not necessarily
inconsistent with a constitutional regime. Constitutional democracies such as
the United States are signatories to international instruments setting out the
laws of war that prohibit the killing of innocents and disallow prisoner of war
status to combatants serving an entity that violates this injunction. 264 As the
Moussaoui's case would likely result in his prosecution before a military tribunal).
261 317 U.S. 1, 39-41 (1942) (distinguishing military tribunals and Article III courts by
identifying the different constitutional procedures that apply).
262 Id. (discussing the Sixth Amendment in relation to military tribunals).
263 Scholars have engaged in extensive debate on this issue. Compare Kenneth
Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of
Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 613-20 (2002) (arguing that military tribunals are
appropriate under international law), Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 249-50 (2002)
(arguing the validity of the Administration's Military Order establishing military tribunals),
and Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 274-75 (2002) (discussing
statutory authority for military tribunals), with Katyal & Tribe, supra note 5, at 1267-77
(arguing that express legislative authority, including declaration of war, is required), Diane
F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting
Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2002)
(criticizing Quirin), and Turley, supra note 5, at 735-39 (same).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557 (E.D. Va. 2002). The
Lindh court employed the Geneva Convention's four-pronged test, under which combatants,
to acquire "combatant status," must:
1) have a fixed command structure,
2) wear a common uniform, emblem, or insignia,
3) carry arms openly, and,
4) comply with the law and customs of war.
Geneva Convention, supra note 154, art. 4(A)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40.
Under the Geneva Convention, combatants without uniforms may still be considered lawful
if they have taken up arms "spontaneously" to resist an invading military force and respect
the laws of war. Id. 6 U.S.T. at 3322, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40. A federal court has found that
this provision does not confer prisoner of war status on members of the Taliban, since they
violated the laws of war by targeting civilians. See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 557-58.
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Quirin Court observed, the United States' use of military tribunals to
adjudicate violations of the laws of war dates from the Revolutionary War and
was familiar to the framers.265 Individuals such as the September 11 hijackers,
who concealed their identities and intentions to facilitate the killing of
innocents on behalf of a transnational network, qualify as "enemy belligerents"
not materially different from the Nazi saboteurs whose trial before a military
tribunal the Supreme Court authorized in Quirin.266 Just as an institutional
equity approach would find implied legislative authority in Congress's Joint
Resolution after September 11 for the bounded detention of alleged enemy
combatants subject to procedural safeguards, it would find authority for
military tribunals similarly cabined.267
An institutional equity approach will be most helpful in determining what
safeguards apply to the conduct of military tribunals. A court will consider
first the likelihood of a false positive outcome. As noted above, the Court on
habeas review has interpreted the jurisdiction of military tribunals narrowly to
encompass cases of "enemy belligerents" who have committed violations of
the law of war.268 In Quirin, for example, the Court denied relief based on the
facts conceded by all parties that petitioners entered United States territory "in
time of war" on a mission designed to destroy property in the United States
"used or useful in prosecuting the war. '269 The Court distinguished Ex parte
Milligan,270 a case heard immediately after the Civil War, which held on
habeas review that a military tribunal lacked jurisdiction to try a long-time
Indiana resident for sedition when civilian courts were functioning properly;
the Court determined that Milligan was "not.. . a part of or associated with the
armed forces of the enemy." 271
Moussaoui's case is close enough to Milligan's to require a searching
review on habeas of evidence supporting a military tribunal's assertion of
jurisdiction. Moussaoui, in contradistinction to Milligan, is not a United States
265 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 & n.9 (noting the case of British Army Major John Andre,
who was tried and convicted before a military commission convened by George Washington
in 1780 after being apprehended within United States lines in disguise and with false papers
on a mission to contact the traitorous General Benedict Arnold).
266 See id. at 15-17 (authorizing jurisdiction to the military commission based on the "law
of war," which includes crimes "anywhere 'within the lines of a belligerent').
267 See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (reenacting Article 15 of the Articles of War after
Quirin's interpretation of Article 15 as authorizing military tribunals).
268 As the Court indicated in Quirin, habeas always lies to raise the issue of the legality
of an individual's confinement within United States territory. 317 U.S. at 24. The Court
will therefore hear the petition, despite the failure of the President's Military Order, like
Roosevelt's Order during World War II, to expressly allow for habeas review.
269 Id. at 36-37.
270 71 U.S. 2, 121-27 (1866) (indicating the boundaries between the need for martial law
and the protections of the Constitution).
271 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (limiting Ex parte Milligan to the facts and circumstances of
that case).
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citizen and has acknowledged that he is a member of Al Qaeda. 27 2 Moussaoui
claims, however, that his mission, designated by bin al-Shibh, concerned
training not for the September 11 attacks but for future attacks abroad not
necessarily involving United States nationals or property.273  Although
President Bush's Military Order asserts authority to try any member of a
terrorist organization in a military tribunal, allowing mere membership to
support military tribunal jurisdiction would create a far-reaching forum beyond
the narrow range of actions constituting enemy belligerency under the case
law.2 74 To support jurisdiction, the government would need to make a prima
facie showing that a defendant, like the petitioners in Quirin, sought
clandestinely to injure persons or property within the United States on behalf
of a foreign power or entity, including a terrorist organization such as Al
Qaeda.275  This jurisdictional threshold reinforces the centrality of the
exculpatory information Moussaoui seeks from bin al-Shibh.
The adequacy of remedies element falls into place upon recognition of the
importance of access to exculpatory evidence in ascertaining the jurisdiction of
a military tribunal. Suppose a defendant can counter the government's effort
to make a prima facie showing that he is an enemy belligerent. Under
Milligan, the government has an adequate remedy: trial in civilian courts on
charges of providing material support to a terrorist organization.276
Admittedly, prosecution on this basis would not result in the death penalty or a
life sentence. 277 In a constitutional democracy, however, the government
should hesitate to select a forum based solely on an a priori view of the
desirability of a particular punishment.
The balance of hardships tilts in the same direction. The government must
assert that even the generic arguments about disruption of interrogation they
272 See Shenon, supra note 74 (reporting Moussaoui's admitted ties to Al Qaeda and
loyalty to Osama bin Laden).
273 United States v. Moussaoui, No. Cr-01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 10, 2003).
274 See generally Katyal & Tribe, supra note 5 (highlighting the fallacies of President
Bush's Military Order in light of relevant law).
275 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31 (distinguishing between "lawful and unlawful
combatants," and proclaiming jurisdiction of military tribunals over unlawful combatants).
276 While some courts have found particular terms such as "personnel" in the definition
of material support to be vague, see, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 404 (9th Cir. 2003), Moussaoui's own admission that he came to the
United States with the specific intent to receive training for future violence on Al Qaeda's
behalf allays the concerns about fair notice that drive vagueness doctrine. See Margulies,
Virtues and Vices, supra note 10, at 205-06 ("[Tlhe Constitution would allow the
government to apply the term 'personnel' to an individual employed by [a designated
terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda] or under its control who knowingly assists the
organization.").
277 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000) (imposing as a penalty "[a fine] under this title,
imprison[ment for] not more than 15 years, or both).
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have already raised in federal court are sufficient to defeat access, under the
implied authority provided by the Congress's Military Force Authorization of
September 2001. The petitioner, however, can counter with the mandate under
the federal statutes establishing habeas corpus jurisdiction that courts "'dispose
of the matter as law and justice require' . . . ."278 Courts should not lightly
assume that Congress would, upon the Executive's mere assertion of exigency,
dispense with habeas petitioners' "opportunity to present and contest facts. ' 279
Taking the government on faith would also undermine the Court's integrity in
a manner far more fundamental than the ex parte contacts in Quirin between
the government and members of the Court,280 which an institutional equity
perspective would view as largely cured by the undisputed factual predicate
that supported military jurisdiction in Quirin.281
Deferring to the government would also yield the opportunity costs
associated with lack of concern for principles of fairness built into international
law.282 If the United States wishes to foster and maintain the cooperation of
other nations in antiterrorism efforts, it should demonstrate its commitment to
consistency with international norms in the conduct of military tribunals. The
chorus of criticism that greeted the Military Order establishing the tribunals 283
has squarely placed the burden of proof on the United States in the court of
world opinion. On this view, fairness is a strategic as well as legal
imperative, 284 undercutting the Executive's assertion of exigency as a
278 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Harris v. Nelson,
394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 1651(a) (2000))), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, 2004).
279 See id. at 601-02. The Due Process Clause's guarantees of fairness inform this
interpretation of the habeas statute's mandate. Id. at 601 (stating that a procedural due
process inquiry involves consideration of the private interest affected, the state's interest,
and "'the risk of an erroneous deprivation... [coupled with] the probable value ... of
additional or substitute safeguards' (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976))).
280 See Turley, supra note 5, at 734-43 (exposing the inadequacies of the Quirin
precedent and its limits as applied to the actions of the Bush administration).
281 Cf Katyal & Tribe, supra note 5, at 1280-93 (distinguishing Quirin from potential
disputes about President Bush's Military Order).
282 See Protocol I: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
art. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 37, 37-78 (requiring fairness in trials of unlawful combatants);
Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 263, at 661-62 ("President Bush's Military Order does
not even purport to provide [the] safeguards [established in Protocal I].").
283 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 263, at 277 (pointing to concerns of
constitutionality and infringement on civil liberties provoked by the Bush Military Order).
284 See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE 110, 115-17 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (discussing the role
played by concern about perceptions of American legitimacy during the Cold War in the
development of civil rights law); cf Margulies, Regime Change, supra note 153 (arguing for
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monolithic force.
Taking the likelihood of false positives, the adequacy of remedies, and the
balance of hardships, the path of institutional equity is clear. An Article III
court or a military tribunal seeking to prove that it took guidance from a body
of principles transcending any particular appointing authority285 would order
the government to provide a defendant with reasonable access to sources of
exculpatory evidence. Only this result will accord proper weight to exigency,
equality, and institutional integrity.
CONCLUSION
A case like Moussaoui demonstrates the challenges crises yield for courts.
Procedures that, even in normal times, secure only a grudging toleration from
the public seem like quaint artifacts government can no longer afford. Indeed,
the values of fairness and process that are the institutional stock in trade of
courts appear as obstacles, particularly where, as in antiterrorism efforts, the
disputes that courts are called upon to adjudicate involve the war and foreign
affairs powers committed by the Constitution to the political branches. This
image of judicial irrelevance has attained such currency that commentators
concerned with the preservation of constitutionalism in crises look elsewhere
as a matter of course.
Those asserting judicial irrelevance-including both political officials
seeking to expand government power and oppositional groups hoping to take
public indignation to the streets-act hastily when they write off the courts.
Crises such as the September II attacks require a governmental response that
integrates three core criteria: exigency, equality, and systemic integrity.
Exigency refers to the need for flexibility in detecting and deterring future
danger. Equality warns of the temptation to create false positives by singling
out members of vulnerable groups. Integrity embodies the vigilance about
false positives that fearful or arrogant officials can sacrifice on the altar of
exigency. Integrating these criteria has historically been the obligation of the
judiciary.
Courts have not performed this daunting task with uniform success.
Deference to exigency has often carried the day, spawning episodes like
Korematsu that submerge democratic values. In reaction, a few courts and
commentators have permitted their distrust of deference to move too far in the
direction of a doctrinaire absolutism. Ironically, the absolutists have emerged
at the same unhappy juncture as champions of deference, disdaining the
importance of multilateral transitions that reflect heightened American commitments to
inclusion and accountability).
285 See Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 263, at 659-60 (arguing that military tribunals
are inherently unfair because "[w]hen active duty military officers assume the role of
judges, they remain subordinate to their superiors"). But see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
39-45 (1942) (finding no inherent unfairness in military tribunals, and noting their long
history well known to the framers); Goldsmith & Bradley, supra note 263, at 249-50 (same).
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onerous job of accommodating changing needs to democratic wisdom.
The conception of institutional equity advanced in this article reflects a more
pragmatic tradition in American law. This tradition, embodied in seemingly
disparate cases such as Milligan, the Steel Seizure Case, and Zadvydas,
acknowledges that courts weighing the legality of emergency measures must
exercize equitable discretion that integrates institutional values and
prerogatives into a "workable government. '286  On this account, courts
deciding issues such as the scope of the government's authority to detain
individuals as enemy combatants must use the flexibility found in the
intertwined jurisprudence of remedies and habeas corpus to reconcile
exigency, equality, and integrity
The jurisprudence of remedies and habeas offers guidance to courts
practicing institutional equity. Three factors are paramount: the likelihood of
false positives, the adequacy of less intrusive remedies, and the balance of
hardships struck between factors such as the consequences of seeking express
rather than implied legislative authority, the avoidance of constitutional
questions, and consistency with international law norms. Taken together, these
factors form a model of practical judgment that rejects the tempting certainties
of deference or absolutism.
Assessing the likelihood of false positives is a central element in this model.
As cases like Milligan, Quirin, and Zadvydas demonstrate, courts will find a
way to review the essential fairness of individuals' adjudication and
confinement, even when exigent measures, such as procedures establishing
military tribunals, fail to provide for such review. The adequacy of existing
remedies is also important. In cases like Milligan and the Steel Seizure Case,
the Court rejected exigent measures at least in part because existing remedies,
like the civilian court system in Milligan or a statutory cooling-off period and
the ability to shut down noncompliant plants in the Steel Seizure Case, seemed
to be sufficient to meet the need. Balance of hardships is a more nuanced
calculus. Often, the Court will use limits on the duration of detention to
harmonize interests. Courts should also tailor default devices such as clear
statement rules to preserve the Executive's room to maneuver in matters of war
or foreign policy, while imposing constraints that reduce the possibility of
abuse and harmonize exigent measures with international law.
Courts can apply institutional equity to resolve some of the most challenging
issues of law and terrorism. Institutional equity would require procedural
safeguards such as time limits, evidentiary proceedings, and access to counsel
in connection with the detention of alleged "enemy combatants" such as Jose
Padilla. Institutional equity would also require that the government grant
terrorism defendants such as Zacarias Moussaoui access to exculpatory
evidence subject to conditions that protect the public interest and that courts
dismiss all charges where the government's denial of access prejudices a
286 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [The Steel Seizure Case], 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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defendant's right to a fair trial.
Finally, institutional equity would uphold a defendant's access to
exculpatory evidence in proceedings before a military tribunal based on the
statutory mandate of habeas courts to do what "law and justice requires. '287 At
a minimum, courts should require that a defendant before a military tribunal
have access to evidence regarding jurisdictional facts such as whether a
defendant was acting as an "enemy belligerent" seeking to injure United States
property or persons. The focus on jurisdictional facts would ensure that the
government reserved military tribunals for violations of the laws of war as
manifest as those committed by the defendants in Quirin. Without such a
jurisdictional showing, courts balancing the hardships would relegate the
government to the venerable alternative embraced in Milligan: trying the
defendant in a civilian court.
Courts charged with reconciling exigency, equality, and integrity after
September 11 do not have an easy assignment. Uncritical deference is far less
taxing. In responding to deference's abdication of responsibility, institutional
equity is not without its discontents. As the district court decision in
Moussaoui demonstrates, attempts at harmonizing values can sometimes mask
continuing harm to rights. All that institutional equity can offer is a framework
for the vigilance required of courts, commentators, and the public. What
remains is the practice necessary to both respond to crises and preserve the
continuity of constitutional traditions.
287 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2003).
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